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DISABILITY UNDER A JUDICIAL MICROSCOPE: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR
CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT
STEVEN PLITT, VALERIE J. FASOLO, & DANIEL MALDONADO*
INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court have begun to address
some of the legislative gaps left open by Congress when it enacted
the Rehabilitation Act (RA). Unlike its more comprehensive statu-
tory sister, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), there were
several unanswered important questions about the scope of and
remedies available under the RA. This Article surveys the relevant
case law, and provides an overview of the impact of various recent
Supreme Court decisions affecting the RA which should assist prac-
titioners litigating and advising clients in the area of disability
discrimination.
Part I of this Article discusses the first issue facing disability-
discrimination claimants; namely, whether there is a private right of
action implied under the RA. The statutory scheme of the RA does
not specifically address this issue. Although most circuit courts
have ultimately come to the conclusion that an implied right of ac-
tion exists under the RA, the question initially caused much dispute
among the circuit courts. Recently, the United States Supreme
Court resolved the right of action issue in Barnes v. Gorman when it
summarily acknowledged that a private right of action exists under
the RA.'
After determining that a claim can be brought by an individual
under the RA, the next issue to be confronted by claimants is the
proper scope of remedies available under the RA. Once again, this
issue was left unanswered by Congress, which created another cir-
cuit court split. Accordingly, Part II first discusses the possible rem-
* Steven Plitt is an Adjunct Professor with the Arizona State University College
of Law and is a Shareholder with the Phoenix law firm of Bess Kunz. ValerieJ. Fasolo is
an attorney with the New Jersey law firm of Proskauer Rose. Daniel Maldonado is an
attorney with Bess Kunz.
1. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002).
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edies available for an RA violation. Part II discusses the Supreme
Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools2 and
the Court's determination that monetary damages are available as a
remedy under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Part II also discusses
how the Supreme Court's analysis of remedies under the RA im-
pacted competing arguments proffered by lower courts in conclud-
ing whether punitive damages are or are not available under the
RA.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's holding in Barnes con-
cluding that punitive damages are not available under either the
ADA or the RA. This Article concludes that if the Gorman decision
is an inaccurate interpretation of congressional intent Congress
could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from punitive
damages.
Having decided that a right of action exists under the RA and
the scope of available remedies for a violation thereunder, the next
question facing litigants is whether sovereign immunity exists. Part
IV of this Article discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, in which the Court held that
Congress exceeded its authority in abrogating the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the ADA.3 This Article concludes
that Congress exceeded its authority in abrogating the states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity in enacting the RA as well. Part IV
then discusses whether Congress can exact a waiver of a state's sov-
ereign immunity from RA violations through the Spending Clause.
Part IV also briefly discusses the doctrine of "unconstitutional con-
ditions" and concludes that the acceptance of federal funds does
not constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Part V of this Article briefly discusses the next issue facing
claimants: whether a litigant can completely avoid the turbulent
and judicially uncertain waters of the RA by pursuing a civil rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon a violation of the RA.
Part VI discusses whether a jury trial is available when bringing an
RA claim and focuses on the right to ajury trial stemming from the
Seventh Amendment.
2. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
3. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000).
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Part VII discusses the applicable statute of limitations for an RA
violation. Once again, Congress failed to identify a specific statute
of limitations period for the RA. The United States Supreme Court
has not yet spoken on the statute of limitations issue in a conclusive
manner and the circuit courts are divided yet again. Part VII first
discusses the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to the selection of the
appropriate statute of limitations period. It discusses application by
various courts of a forum state's analogous personal injury statute
and compares the statute of limitations to the administrative re-
quirements under the ADA. Part VII concludes that because the
RA and the ADA are twin statutes, the statute of limitations period
for an RA violation should be comparable to the administrative fil-
ing deadlines that apply to the ADA. The Supreme Court's recent
decision in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan4 provides some
guidance regarding the limitations period for RA claims based on a
hostile work environment. Part VII discusses the Supreme Court's
conclusions in Morgan and contends that Morgan is applicable to
hostile work environment claims brought under the RA.
Finally, Part VIII briefly discusses whether an individual, rather
than a government entity, can be personally liable for a violation of
the RA.
I. IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR RA VIOLATONS
In 1973 Congress enacted Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 701-7961, as a general civil rights provision for the handicapped. 5
4. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
5. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir.
1987) (Section 504 is a "civil rights statute .. . closely analogous to section 1983");
Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Like § 1983, § 504
may also be described as 'conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights.'"
(quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985))).
Section 501 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 791, prohibits discrimination in employment.
Section 502, 29 U.S.C. § 792, deals with architectural and transportation barriers to
mainstreaming persons with handicaps. Section 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793, prohibits discrim-
ination by federal contractors. These provisions, including § 504 and § 505, are gener-
ally referred to as Title V of the RA ("Title V").
There are four types of discriminatory barriers that handicapped individuals may
confront when seeking employment: (1) intentional discrimination for reasons of social
bias; (2) neutral standards with disparate impact; (3) surmountable barriers to the im-
paired; and (4) insurmountable barriers to the impaired. Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Note, Accommodating the Handi-
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Section 504 prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals by
entities receiving federal funding.6 Section 504 originally applied
only to programs receiving federal funding, but the 1978 Amend-
ments to the RA made Section 504 applicable to federal agencies. 7
In enacting the RA Congress's stated intent was "to prevent discrim-
ination against all handicapped individuals.. .in employment, hous-
ing, transportation, education, health services, and any other
federally-aided programs."
capped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55
N.Y.U.L. REV. 881, 883-84 (1980)).
6. Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....
29 U.S.C. § 794 (a).
Section 504 closely tracks the language of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d) ("Title VI"), which apparently was its model. Title VI in-
volved effective and operative prohibition against discrimination on the ground of race,
color or national origin. Although Section 504 was enacted as part of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, its nondiscrimination principle was initially proposed as an amend-
ment to Title VI. Representative Vanik first introduced this proposed amendment in
the House. See H.R. 14033, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rc. 9712 (1972); H.R.
12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 45945 (1971). Senators Humphrey and
Percy proposed a similar measure in the Senate. See S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118
CONG. REc. 525-526 (1972). The nondiscrimination principle was reshaped in the next
Congress and enacted as Section 504. Senator Humphrey and Representative Vanik
stated that the intent of their original amendments to Title VI had been incorporated
into Section 504. 119 CONG. REc. 6145 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 118
CONG. REc. 32310 (1972) (same); 119 CONC. REc. 7114 (1973) (statement of Rep.
Vanik). See also, 118 CONG. REC. 30680 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph describing
origins of Section 504).
7. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 1, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (hereinafter "1978
Amendments"). The1978 Amendments closed the loophole and subjected the federal
government to Section 504. See also, 124 CONG. REC. 13,901 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Jeffords) (stating that 1978 Amendments eliminate federal government's exemption);
id. at 38,549 (statement of Rep. Brademas) (stating that 1978 Amendments require
federal compliance); id. at 38,551 (statement of Rep. Jeffords) (stating that 1978
Amendments eliminate federal government's exemption); id. at 38,552 (statement of
Rep. Sarasin) (stating that 1978 Amendments extend coverage to federal government).
8. Lora v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1228 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (quoting S. REP. No. 1294, 93rd Congr., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6388). See also, 29 U.S.C. § 794. This statute does not prohibit discrimination
against the handicapped as such; it simply bars the use of federal funds to support
programs or activities that so discriminate. See U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veter-
ans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
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Facially, Section 504 did not authorize suits by private parties. 9
Prior to the 1978 Amendments to the RA, several circuit courts con-
cluded that a private right of action existed for Section 504 viola-
tions. 10 Several courts found that a private right of action against a
Section 504 is similar to other statutes placing conditions on the receipt of federal
funding. See e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1982) (sex discrimination prohibited by any educational program or activity receiving
federal funds). The Supreme Court has observed:
Under the program-specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and § 504, Congress
enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients
of the funds: the recipient's acceptance of the funds triggers coverage
under the nondiscrimination provision.
U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1986). This
approach must be distinguished by those enactments that Congress, in the exercise of
its regulatory power, prohibits discrimination directly. See e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982); Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 24549
(1964).
The federal policies underpinning the RA and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 ("ADA"), are similar. Both statutes were enacted to, among
other things, assist disabled persons in finding and maintaining employment. Compare
29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2) (one purpose of the RA is "to ensure that the Federal Govern-
ment plays a leadership role in promoting the employment of individuals with disabili-
ties . . . and in assisting States and providers of services in fulfilling the aspirations of
such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and gainful employment") with 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1) (an objective of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties"). The language of Title II of the ADA also tracks the language of Section 504.
Congress's intent was that Title II extend the protections of the RA "to cover all pro-
grams of the state of local governments, regardless of the receipt of federal financial
assistance' and that it work in the same manner as Section 504." Hainze v. Richards,
207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). Federal employees, however, have no remedy for
employment discrimination under the ADA- Their sole claim for discrimination on the
basis of disability, if any, is under the RA. Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103-04 (2nd
Cir. 1998).
9. Doe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 1991).
10. Davis v. Southeastern Cmty. Coll., 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978); Leary v.
Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d
413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Leary
v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977). See also, Kling v. County of L.A., 633 F.2d 876,
878 (9th Cir. 1980); Camenisch v. Univ. of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1980);
NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d
533 (10th Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court had also suggested that a private right of action does exist
under Section 504. See, Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
Lower courts had also held that a private right of action existed under Section 504.
Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1981); Coleman v. Casey
County. Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1980); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F.
Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Si-
mon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Guertin v. Hackerman,
496 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979);
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non-government defendant could be implied even though particu-
lar statutory language grants no such right explicitly. Many also
agreed that this conclusion remained even though the legislative
history of a particular statute is silent on Congress's intent to pro-
vide it." The United States Supreme Court has delineated four fac-
Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980); Upshur v. Love, 474
F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Cruz v. Collazo, 84 F.R.D. 307 (D.P.R. 1979); Boxall v.
Sequoia Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Howard S. v.
Friendswood Indep. Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Davis v. Bucher, 451
F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Coleman, 451 F.
Supp. 7 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afffd. in part, rev'd. in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Crawford v. Univ. of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C.
1977); Barnes v. Converse Coll., 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
11. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S.
77, 94 (1981) (holding that silent legislative history would not be fatal in implying pri-
vate right of action with some other indication of congressional intent); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (holding that congressional
intent to grant private right of action need not be express but may "appear implicitly in
the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of enactment"); Can-
non v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (holding that when a statute grants
specific rights to a certain class, the explicit purpose to deny a remedy would be control-
ling and not the absence of an explicit purpose to create one); Osborn v. Am. Ass'n of
Retired Persons, 660 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1981) ("congressional silence is not neces-
sarily fatal to implication of a private right of action").
However, if a statute is silent and the legislative history is silent as to a private right
of action, then such silence cannot justify implying a private right of action against the
United States because Congress must unequivocally express its intent to create such a
right. Doe, 941 F.2d at 789. Federal courts have consistently refused to imply private
rights of action against the United States or to ignore a condition on a sovereign immu-
nity waiver when the statute and legislative history are either silent or indicate a con-
gressional intent not to grant the right requested. See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S.
834, 844-48 (1986) (holding that government waived its sovereign immunity in Quiet
Title Act only with respect to one class of cases because the United States was not men-
tioned as a potential party with regard to other class); Block v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273, 287-
90 (1983) (holding that language of Quiet Title Act and legislative history contained no
indication that Congress intended to exempt states from condition on sovereign immu-
nity waiver); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-70 (1981) (holding that Age Dis-
crimination in the Employment Act's language, structure, and legislative history
indicated Congress's intent that waiver of United States' sovereign immunity was condi-
tioned on the victim having no right to a jury trial); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
392 (1976) (holding that there was no indication either in the language of the Classifi-
cation Act or its legislative history that plaintiffs were entitled to back pay for positions
to which they should have been appointed); Gaj v. U.S. Postal Serv., 800 F.2d 64 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that the Postal Reorganization Act is proscriptive with no focus on a
benefited class, and that the statute's language and legislative history did not show a
congressional intent to create a private remedy); California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977
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tors in deciding whether Congress implies a private right of action
in a federal statute: (1) whether the plaintiff falls within "the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted;" (2) whether
Congress indicated an intent, either explicitly or implicitly, to cre-
ate or deny a remedy; (3) whether the remedy is consistent with the
statute's underlying purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action
is traditionally pursued in a state, rather than federal, forum.1 2
In the pre-1978 Amendment era, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Lloyd v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., noted that the Supreme
Court held that Title VI provided a private right of action in a unan-
imous decision. 13 The Circuit Court held that Title VI was nearly
identical to Section 504 and that, therefore, the Supreme Court's
ruling was dispositive on the issue of whether a private right of ac-
tion was available under Section 504. Although the Seventh Cir-
cuit's holding in Lloyd did not address the enumerated factors
discussed above, in Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., the Ninth Circuit
did.14 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit noted that the second factor -
Congress's intent to create or deny a remedy - is the central inquiry
in determining whether a private right of action is available under
Section 504.15 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit primarily focused
on Congress's intent in deciding the issue.
The congressional debates on the 1978 Amendments demon-
strate that Congress was aware federal courts were interpreting Sec-
tion 504 to provide a private right of action.1 6 However, Congress
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that the language and legislative history of a
statute on hazardous waste disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, indicated congressional intent to
waive sovereign immunity only from suits for injunctive relief and not from criminal
sanctions); Patentas v. U.S., 687 F.2d 707, 710-13 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that there was
no explicit congressional intent in language or legislative history of the Ports and Wa-
terways Safety Act of 1972 to waive immunity from private lawsuits against Coast Guard);
California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that neither the express terms of the statute nor the legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162, jurisdictional statute for criminal offenses in Indian territory, revealed any con-
gressional intent to waive Tribe's sovereign immunity).
12. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
13. 548 F.2d at 1277 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)).
14. 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. Id. at 788 n.15 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575
(1979)).
16. 124 CONG. REc. 37,508 (statement of Sen. Stafford) ("[t]o date we have per-
mitted certain private enforcement of Title V" of the RA). Doe, 941 F.2d at 787 n.13
("Congress was aware that section 504 provided an implied private right of action. Yet
2003]
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chose not to expressly abolish a private right of action. In fact, Con-
gress recognized that Section 502(a), the implementing provision
of Section 504, permitted a judicial remedy through a private right
of action.17 Congress provided for the recovery of attorneys' fees
for successful litigants as a means to encourage private enforce-
ment.'8 The Ninth Circuit determined, from the 1978 debates, that
Congress did not eliminate this remedy but rather enforced it by adding section 505.
We see no congressional intent to abolish the private right of action and every intent to
reinforce it."). Congress also knew that Tide VI provided an implied private right of
action when it amended Section 504 and added the remedy provision contained in
Section 505(a)(2). Id. at 787 (citing 124 CONG. REc. 30,349 (statement of Sen. Bayh)).
17. The committee report to the Senate stated:
This approach to implementation of Section 504, which closely follows [Ti-
tle VI]. ... would ensure administrative due process (right to hearing, right
to review), provide for administrative consistency within the Federal gov-
ernment as well as relative ease of implementation, and permit a judicial
remedy through a private action.
S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39-40 (1974), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6391 (emphasis
added).
18. Section 505(b) provides in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce or charge a violation of a provision of [Title V], the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Doe that the Senate
focused on the attorneys' fees provision in Section 505 to encourage private enforce-
ment and intended for the provision to parallel the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 941 F.2d at 792.
The Ninth Circuit primarily focused on Senator Alan Cranston's remark during
the congressional debates. Senator Cranston believed that the attorneys' fees provision
in Section 505(b) would permit access to the courts by handicapped individuals:
Such allowance of attorneys' fees would be an important step in assisting all
handicapped individuals in their struggle by permitting equal access to the
courts to enforce the provisions of Title V.
124 CONG. REc. 30,346. Senator Cranston also believed that private enforcement was
an essential part of vindicating the rights of handicapped individuals. Id. ("Private en-
forcement of these title V rights is an important necessary aspect of assuring that these
rights are vindicated and enforcement is uniform. The availability of attorneys' fees
should assist substantially in this respect."); see also, id. at 30,349 (statement of Sen.
Cranston) (commenting on the need to provide attorneys' fees to handicapped individ-
uals to ensure private enforcement of Title V to the RA). Senator Cranston also noted
that the senate report accompanying the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976
also extolled the needs of private enforcement:
(A)ll ... civil rights law depend [sic] heavily upon private enforcement, and
fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate congressional policies which these
laws contain.
Doe, 941 F.2d at 792 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011).
Senator Stafford echoed Senator Cranston's remarks and reiterated the need for
private enforcement of Title V:
[Vol. 47
DISABILITY UNDER A JUDICIAL MICROSCOPE
Congress wanted to develop uniformity among Title V's provisions
to give all handicapped individuals equal opportunities to achieve
justice. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended
to encourage private parties to pursue enforcement of Section 504
through a private right of action. 19
Section 504 provides that the procedures set forth to enforce
Title VI shall be available for the enforcement of the RA. 20 Several
circuit courts addressing the issue of implied private rights of action
hold that litigants suing private recipients of federal funds under
Section 504 do not need to exhaust Tide VI administrative reme-
dies.21 Essentially, these courts agree that Title VI's administrative
remedies provide for the termination of federal financial assistance
for violations, but do not "include or encompass equitable relief for
the affected individual." 22 Thus, these circuit courts hold that the
applicable remedies under Title VI do not provide meaningful indi-
To date we have permitted certain private enforcement of Tide V and, yet,
we have not provided the means by which such private rights of action are
meaningful. This provision will go a long way toward assisting handicapped
individuals in their efforts to achieve their full and equal share of the rights
to which they are entitled.
124"CONG. REC. 37,507.
19. Doe, 941 F.2d at 792.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (2).
21. See, e.g., Freed v. Consol. Rail Corp., 201 F.3d 188, 191 (3rd Cir. 2000); Bren-
nan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 268 n.12 (1st Cir. 1998); Tuck v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn.,
Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 470-71 (6th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir.
1990); Miener v. State of Mo., 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir. 1982); Pushkin v. Regents of
the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Lloyd, 548 F.2d at 1287. See
also, Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 282 n.17 (3rd Cir. 1996)
(Section 504 "is not ordinarily subject to an exhaustion requirement"); but see, Downey
v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 139, 145-46 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("The purpose of the requirement of
primary resort to the EEOC is to provide notice to the employer and to encourage
conciliation and voluntary compliance.").
Title VI provides two different paths for pursuing relief, depending on the claim-
ant's status. Recipients of federal assistance may pursue judicial or administrative relief
when challenging an agency's administrative or regulatory action as a funds administra-
tor. Doe, 941 F.2d at 787 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2). Victims of discrimination can
pursue an implied private right of action. Id.
22. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1381 (holding that Title VI provides for the termination
of federal financial assistance to "programs" that violate Title VI and does not "include
or encompass equitable relief for the affected individual."); Tuck, 7 F.3d at 471 ("the
applicable remedies provide no individual relief, including no damage orders against
an employer").
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vidual relief 23 and that a victim of discrimination can recover dam-
ages directly in court.2 4 Congress's reluctance to expressly enact
legislation requiring a victim of discrimination to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies before bringing a lawsuit under Section 504 lends
further support to the contention that discrimination victims can
go directly to court.
25
Although Congress could have explicitly provided for a private
right of action when amending Section 504 and enacting Section
505, Congress's failure to do so (or silence) should not be con-
strued as foreclosing a private right of action. Given that during
the congressional debates, Congress specifically addressed the issue
of private enforcement of Section 504 and explicitly provided for
attorneys' fees for successful litigants, it stands to reason that an
implied private right of action should be available under Section
504. The administrative remedies available are simply inadequate
to vindicate the rights of discrimination victims and a strict adher-
ence to such remedies would only frustrate the purposes of the
RA. 26 The Supreme Court recently resolved the issue in Barnes v.
23. For example, the Department of Transportation regulations implementing
Section 504 (49 C.F.R. pt. 27) allow an aggrieved individual to file a written complaint.
49 C.F.R. § 27.123(b). However, the regulations do not provide for individual relief. In
addition, an informal dispute resolution may be held with the recipient of federal
funds, but if these efforts are unsuccessful, the Department of Transportation may de-
termine, after a hearing, if it should suspend or terminate funding. See 49 C.F.R.
§§ 27.123(d) & 27.125. The complainant is notified of the time and place of the hear-
ing, but the regulations do not make any provisions for the complainant to participate
in the hearing or to recover damages. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.127 & 27.127(a) (2). See also,
Freed, 201 F.3d at 193 (holding that the Department of Transportation regulations were
inadequate); Miener, 673 F.2d at 978 (finding that the Department of Health and
Human Services administrative process is inadequate because a Section 504 plaintiff
may not furnish evidence or participate in an investigation, appeal an adverse decision,
or recover damages); Doe, 941 F.2d at 787 (noting that Title VI and the pre-1978 Sec-
tion 504 "provide only for review of the administrative and regulatory actions taken by
an agency in administering its funding programs.").
24. Freed, 201 F.3d at 193-94; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1382 ("We hold that under § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act the plaintiff is not compelled to pursue a remedy which is
irrelevant to his particular need.").
25. Andrews v. Consol. Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 1987).
26. As a remedial statute, Section 504 should be broadly construed to effectuate
its purposes. Cf, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[W]e are guided by
the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be con-
strued broadly to effectuate its purposes.").
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Gorman27 when it implicitly acknowledged without substantial dis-
cussion that a private right of action is available under the RA.
II. REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR RA VIOLATIONS
The RA was amended in 1978 to provide remedies for viola-
tions of Section 504.28 Section 505 was later added and Congress
provided that "[t]he remedies, procedures and rights set forth in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et. seq.)
shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or omission by
any recipient or provider of federal assistance under Section
794...-29 Tide VI prohibits, among other things, discrimination
based on race "under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance." 30 However, Tide VI did not indicate what reme-
dies were available for violations of that statute. 31 As a result, courts
27. 536 U.S. 181 (2002). See Section III infra for a discussion of Gorman.
28. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 1, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2). In order to state a cause of action under Section 504 a
claimant must allege discrimination by or exclusion from a "program or activity" receiv-
ing federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The financial assistance requirement
was discussed by the Supreme Court in United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986). Federal financial assistance may be either mone-
tary or non-monetary. Section 504 is program specific: "it proscribes discrimination
only with respect to 'programs' or 'activities' receiving federal financial assistance."
Foss v. City of Chi., 817 F.2d 34, 35 (7th Cir. 1987).
In 1988 Congress amended the definition of "program" or "activity" to broaden the
reach of Section 504 to "all the operations" of "a department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a state or of a "local government" that receives fed-
eral funding. Act of Mar. 22, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 29 (1988); see
Section 794(b) (1) (A). All of the operations of a department or similar entity receiving
federal financial assistance are subject to regulation. Shroeder v. City of Chi., 715 F.
Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1989), afJd, 927 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1991).
The mandate of Section 504 is inapplicable to future conduct when federal fund-
ing has ended and there is no indication that federal funding will be renewed. Great
Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987).
Congress explicitly made Title VII remedies available for violations of Section 501.
Congress also limited the remedies for violations of Section 504 to those available
under Title VI. Circuit courts have held that the two sections were not intended to
provide alternative means of obtaining relief for the same act of discrimination against
an individual. Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 104-05 (2nd Cir. 1998).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2003).
31. The court in Landgrafv. U.S.I. Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 254 n.8 (1994), ob-
served that by amending the RA to authorize Title VI remedies for Section 504 litigants,
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were divided over the scope of available remedies under both Title
VI and the RA.
32
The Supreme Court initially ruled that in an action under Title
VI or the RA a private claimant could recover damages in the form
of back pay. The Court did not, however, directly address what ad-
ditional remedies might be available under either statute. 33 Before
the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin v. Gwenett County Pub. Sch. ,34
many lower courts were divided on whether tort-style damages such
as compensatory damages for pain, suffering and emotional dis-
tress, were available under Section 504. 35 A majority of courts ad-
dressing the issue of whether monetary damages for mental
anguish, emotional distress, and humiliation were available deter-
mined that they were not.
3 6
Although damages are available under Title VI when there is
proof of intentional conduct, Title VI's provisions do not address
the need for proof of discriminatory intent. The general rule is that
Congress, at least in some respects, transformed Section 504 from "a general right to
sue statute to one with a 'set of circumscribed remedies.'"
32. Justice v. Pendleton Place Apartments, 40 F.3d 139 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, L.
Larson & A. Larson, 3A EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 106.37, endnote 64-65 (1990
and supplement 1993) (collecting cases demonstrating the split over the availability of
compensatory and punitive damages).
33. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (Tide VI); Consol-
idated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (Section 504).
34. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
35. Compare Eastman v. Va. Polytech Inst. & State Univ., 939 F.2d 204, 209 (4th
Cir. 1991) (concluding that Section 504 permits neither compensatory damages for
pain and suffering nor punitive damages), with Kling v. County of L.A., 769 F.2d 532,
534 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 936 (1985) (allowing compensatory dam-
ages for pain and suffering under Section 504).
36. See Rivera Flores v. P.R. Tele. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 71 (D.P.R. 1991) (mental
suffering);Jenkins v. Skinner, 771 F. Supp. 133, 136 (E.D. Va. 1991); ADAPT, Salt Lake
Chapter v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 320, 325 (D. Utah 1991) (emotional
distress or mental anguish); Rhodes v. Charter Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 1383, 1385-86 (S.D.
Miss. 1989) (emotional distress); Shuttleworth v. Broward Co., 649 F. Supp. 35, 36-38
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (mental suffering or humiliation); Martin v. Cardinal Glennon Memo-
rial Hosp. for Children, 599 F. Supp. 284, 284 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (mental anxiety and
humiliation); Bradford v. Iron Co. C-4 Sch. Dist., 1984 WL 1443, 35,404 (E.D. Mo. June
13, 1984) (emotional distress). But cf, Tanberg v. Weld Co. Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970,
972-73 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding that damages for loss of professional opportunity,
mental anguish, and pain and suffering are available for intentional violation of Section
505); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1994).
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damages are only available for intentional conduct.37 Compensa-
tory damages, however, are not available for unintentional viola-
tions of Section 504.38 In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y,9 the Supreme Court expressed concerns that when a recipi-
ent of federal funds "unintentionally" discriminates, the recipient
37. Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
Franklin dealt with damages for intentional violations and did not discuss the availability
of damages for non-intentional violations). Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) (noting
that a "clear majority" of the justices in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
463 U.S. 582 (1983), confirmed that damages were available for intentional violations
of Title VI). A majority of the justices in University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), concluded that Title VI reached only intentional discrimination. It is un-
clear, however, whether the justice in Guardians would have read an intent requirement
into Title VI if they did not give stare decisis to the Bakke decision. See 463 U.S. at 626
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("Were we construing Title VI without the
benefit of any prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude that the
statute was designed to redress more than purposeful discrimination." (citation
omitted)).
The Ninth Circuit in Ferguson held that, although Title VI was enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Clause power, it does not necessarily follow that compensatory
damages are limited to intentional violations of civil rights legislations based upon Con-
gress's Spending Clause power as oppose to legislation based upon Congress's Section 5
power. 157 F.3d at 674.
38. E.g., Wood v. President & Trustees of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d 1214 (1lth
Cir. 1992); Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Sch., 725 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1984).
Congress perceived discrimination against the handicapped as a product of benign
neglect, thoughtlessness and indifference and not invidious animus. Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). Representative Vanik introduced the predecessor to
Section 504 in the House. He described the treatment of handicapped individuals as
one of the country's "shameful oversights" which caused handicapped individuals to
live among society "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored." 117 CONG. Rc. 45974 (1971).
Senator Humphrey introduced a similar measure in the Senate and asserted during the
congressional debates that "we can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handi-
capped in America." 118 CONG. Rxc. 525-526 (1972). Senator Cranston described the
RA as a response to "previous societal neglect." 119 CONG. Rac. 5880, 5883 (1973); see
also 118 CONG. REc. 526 (1972) (statement of Sen. Percy) (describing the legislation as
a national commitment to eliminate the "glaring neglect" of the handicapped). Fed-
eral agencies have also found that discrimination against the handicapped is primarily
the result of apathy rather than discriminatory animus. See, e.g., United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 17 (1983). Com-
mentators have similarly concluded. See, e.g., Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The
Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881,
883 (1980). Nevertheless, invidious discrimination against the handicapped does exist.
See, e. g., Judith Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Oppar-
tunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 403, n. 2 (1984).
39. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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may not be aware of its obligations under a voluntary Title VI pro-
gram.40 "[T]he point of not permitting monetary damages for an
unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds
lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award."
4 1
This Article next discusses the Supreme Court's analysis of the
availability of punitive damages under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 ("Title IX"),42 and
contrasts that analysis with the currently divergent judicial views re-
garding the scope of remedies available under the RA.
A. The Supreme Court's Analysis in Franklin v.
Gwenett County Pub. Sch.
A turning point in the debate over the scope of remedies avail-
able under the RA came in 1994 with the Supreme Court's decision
in Franklin v. Gwenett County Pub. Sch. 43 where the Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether Title IX supports claims for mone-
tary damages. 44 Previously, the Court in Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.
45
determined that an implied right of action exists under Title IX for
intentional violations of its provisions and that a "full panoply of
legal remedies were available. '46 The similarities between Title IX
and Section 504 of the RA made the Court's determination imme-
diately relevant to the debate. In holding that monetary damages
were available under Title IX, the Court stated: "the general rule
... is that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the
federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief on a
cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute."
47
40. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 602.
41. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74. Justice White in the majority opinion in Guardians
reasoned that the Supreme Court's presumption in Pennhurst that a court should only
award limited injunctive relief for unintended violations of statutes enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Clause power applied to Title VI. 463 U.S. at 602 (citing Pennhurst,
451 U.S. at 15).
42. Title IX provides in pertinent part that "No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
43. 503 U.S. 60 (1991).
44. Id. at 62.
45. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
46. Id. at 680.
47. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71.
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The Court in Franklin began its analysis by observing that when
considering an implied right of action under a statute, "the usual
recourse to statutory text and legislative history" may not be particu-
larly enlightening, nor will the period prior to the court's decision
finding such a right to exist be helpful.48 Instead, the Franklin
Court focused its examination on "the state of the law when the
legislation passed, '49 in order to identify the background against
which Congress acted and is presumably aware.
50
Examining the decade before Congress enacted Title IX, the
Court in Franklin found implied rights of action in six instances,
51
three times approving a damages remedy52 because Congress was
aware of the background in which private rights of action were be-
ing declared and legal remedies provided. The Court deemed Con-
gressional omission of any discussion of the matter of damages as
an implicit approval of the availability of a broad spectrum of dam-
ages.53 When a court "implies" a cause of action it does not "create"
it, but rather "discovers" it through the judicial exercise of statutory
construction. 54 The first step in the analysis requires a determina-
tion of what remedies a statutory cause of action were afforded at its
enactment. The second step is to examine subsequent amend-
ments to determine whether Congress later altered its initial
understanding.
Using this approach, the Court in Franklin focused on the
amendments to Title IX following the Court's decision in Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi.55 In Cannon, the Court found that an implied private
right of action existed within Title IX. The Franklin Court looked
to its own past decision for guidance "since Congress was legislating
48. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71 (noting that because the right is implied, it is "hardly
surprising that Congress also said nothing about the applicable remedies.")
49. Id.
50. Id. at 72.
51. Id. at 71-72 & n.7 (examining J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 191 (1967);Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); and Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)).
52. Id. at 72.
53. Id.
54. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-72;J.I. Caseco v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
55. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
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with full cognizance of that decision. '56 The Franklin Court also
looked to Congress's enactment of the Civil Rights Remedies Equal-
ization Amendment of 198657 ("CRREA") which overruled the
Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.58 In Atas-
cadero the Supreme Court examined the unamended version of Sec-
tion 504 of the RA then in effect and found that the RA did not
contain a clear statement of Congress's intent to require states re-
ceiving federal funds to waive their sovereign immunity as to Sec-
tion 504 claims. 59 Congress overruled the Eleventh Amendment's
application, not only as to Section 504 of the RA, but also as to Title
IX, Title VI, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975, 29
U.S.C. § 621-634 "or any other federal statute prohibiting discrimi-
nation by recipients of federal financial assistance." 60 One section
of the curative amendment purportedly went beyond overruling
Atascadero and stated:
In a suit against a state for a violation of a statute referred
to in paragraph (1) remedies, (including remedies both
at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to
the same extent as such remedies are available for such a
violation in a suit against any public or private entity
other than a state. 61
Although the Court in Franklin acknowledged that the above
clause "says nothing about the nature of those other available reme-
dies," the Court concluded that "absent any contrary indication in
the text or history of [a] statute, we presume Congress enacted the
statute with the prevailing traditional rule in mind."62 Three mem-
bers of the Court concurred in the result in Franklin.63 Disagreeing
with the majority view that any action has a presumption of full
remedies available, those in concurrence found that "when rights of
action are judicially implied, categorical limitations upon their re-
56. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (Supp. 1993).
58. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
59. 473 U.S. at 247.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2) (1993).
62. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.
63. Id. at 76 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, CJ., and Thomas, J. concurring).
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medial scope may be judicially implied as well." 64 "Where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a gen-
eral right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any availa-
ble remedy to make good the wrong done."65 The Franklin Court
noted that this long-standing rule is jurisdictional and permits the
exercise of a federal court's power to award appropriate relief in
situations where a cause of action exists under the constitutional
laws of the United States.66 Thus, the relevant question is not
whether a statute demonstrates Congressional intent to authorize a
specific remedy, but whether the statute demonstrates Congres-
sional intent to limit the traditional presumption in favor of any
available remedy.
67
B. Circuit Court Analysis.
Before Franklin but after the 1978 amendments to the RA,
those circuit courts that initially analyzed the damages issue found
an implied cause of action under Section 504.68 The Fourth Circuit
held that the "full panoply" of damages is available under Section
504.69 The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion. 70  The
64. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 77 (Scalia, J. concurring).
65. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1947).
66. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
67. Id. at 1030; See also Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn.
1997); Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158, 167 (D. Del. 1993).
68. See e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980);
Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980); NAACP v. Medical
Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3rd Cir. 1979).
In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328 (1978), a case decided
before the 1978 amendment adding Section 505 to the RA, a majority of the Supreme
Court refused to reach the issue of whether there was a private right of action under
Title VI. However, in 1979, the Court decided Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, the Court observed that a private right of action might
exist under Title IX. Id. at 705-07. The Court assumed, however, that the beneficiaries
of federal assistance come under Title VI, and that a private right of action to satisfy the
second objective of Title VI, the termination of the offending discriminatory activity
itself by declaration or injunctive relief. Id. at 702 n.3; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 419 n.28
(Stephens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. See Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994).
70. See Kling v. Los Angeles, 769 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 474 U.S. 936 (1985). See also Great Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v.
Zolen, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir.
1990).
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Eighth 71 , Eleventh 72, and arguably, the Third73 Circuits have held
that the "full spectrum" of remedies is available under Section 504.
Nearly every court that has addressed the damages issue following
Franklin has determined that compensatory damages are available
under Section 504.74
Initially, a majority of courts held that punitive damages were
not available under Section 504.75 This majority started to change
following Franklin. However, courts remained split on the issue.
Two cases exemplify this split in analysis and result: Moreno v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp.76 (punitive damages not available) and Burns-Vid-
lik v. Chandler77 (punitives damages are available).
1. The Unavailability of Punitive Damages as Discussed in
Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
The Sixth Circuit in Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., addressed
the issue of whether punitive damages were available as a remedy
under Section 504 of the RA.78 A starting point for the court's anal-
ysis was the recognition that pre-Franklin there was virtual unanim-
ity that Section 504 did not allow any recovery of punitive
damages. 79 The court noted that prior to the decision in Franklin,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,80 making punitive
71. See e.g., Rogers v. Magnet Cove Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 1994).
72. See e.g., Waldrop v. Southern Co. Serv., Inc., 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir. 1994).
73. See W.B. v Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3rd Cir. 1995).
74. See e.g., Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807 F. Supp. 701, 704-05 (N.D. Fla. 1992);
Craft v. Memorial Med. Ctr., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 785, 791 (S.D. Ga. 1992); Doe v. District
of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 571-73 (D. D.C. 1992); Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff,
787 F. Supp. 970, 972-74 (D. Colo. 1992); Deleo v. City of Stamford, 919 F. Supp. 70 (D.
Conn. 1995).
75. See Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 790 (6th Cir. 1996) (col-
lecting cases); see also Americans Disabled for Assessable Pub. Trans. v. Skywest Airlines,
Inc., 762 F.Supp. 320 (D. Utah 1991) (finding no punitive damages under Section 504);
Doe v. South Eastern Univ., 732 F. Supp. 7 (D. D.C. 1990) (limiting Section 504 to
equitable remedies).
76. 99 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 1996).
77. 980 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Haw. 1997).
78. The Sixth Circuit had already concluded that a private cause of action to re-
dress violations of Section 504 existed by implication. See e.g. Hall v. United States Pos-
tal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1988).
79. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 790.
80. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 195 Stat. 1071.
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damages available, for the first time, under Section 501 of the RA. 8s
Section 501 applies to "malicious" or "reckless" discrimination by
the government in its role as employer.82 Punitive damages
awarded under Section 501 are subject to a statutory cap of not
more than $300,000.00.83 However, the 1991 Act did not extend
the new punitive damage provision to Section 504.
The court in Moreno could find no legislative reason for Con-
gress to have considered limiting the availability of punitive dam-
ages in 1986 (Civil Rights Equalization Act),84 1987 (Civil Rights
Restoration Act), 85 and 1991 (Civil Rights Act of 1991) because of
prior judicial determinations.8 6 The court found that the only in-
ference of congressional intent that could be properly drawn from
these enactments was that Congress intended Section 504 remedies
to remain in statu quo - i.e., no punitive damages.
87
81. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 790.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 791.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Under Section 505, Title VII remedies apply to Sec-
tion 501. The new Act also made the punitive damage remedy available under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
84. The Civil Rights Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a), makes States subject
to Section 504 as well as Title IX, Title VI, and the ADEA to the same extent as private
parties.
85. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28.
86. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791.
87. Id. at 791 n.5. The court observed:
We note that at the time Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the
majority view among the Circuits was that a person who had been discrimi-
nated against in employment by the federal government could proceed
under either Section 504 or 501. [Citations omitted] We must assume that
Congress was aware of these decisions. If congress had believed punitive
damages were allowed under Section 504, it would have made little sense
for Congress to cap punitive damages under Section 501, but leave Section
504 unaltered. A party against whom the federal government had discrimi-
nated in employment could have circumvented Congress's intent to limit
punitive damages in such cases by pursuing his claim under Section 504
rather than 501. We doubt that Congress would have placed a limit on
punitive damages that could so easily be avoided. The prevailing view in the
Circuit Courts in 1991 when the Civil Rights Act was passed was that a per-
son who had been discriminated against in employment by the federal gov-
ernment could proceed under either Section 504 or 501. See e.g., Gardner
v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1985); Smith v. United States Postal
Service, 742 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1984); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473,
475 (Eleventh Cir. 1983); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292
(5th Cir. 1981).
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The court in Moreno observed that " [i] t would be highly anom-
alous to let a plaintiff asserting an implied right of action under
Section 504 recover more in punitive damages than could be recov-
ered by plaintiff asserting a statutory remedy created for Section
501."88
Next, the court in Moreno found that punitive damages were
not "appropriate relief' as required by Franklin because Congress
had chosen other ways to "punish" those in violation of Section
504.89 As an example, federal spending can be terminated for fail-
ure to comply with Section 504.90 Relying upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association,9' and the so-called "Sea Clammers" doctrine
92
88. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791. This same analysis could be used through a compari-
son with the ADA. Punitive damages are not available against a governmental entity
under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) ("a complaining party may recover puni-
tive damages under this section against respondent (other than a government, a gov-
ernment agency, or political subdivision. ).
89. Moreno, 99 F.3d. at 791.
90. Id. Section 505 (29 U.S.C. § 794a) makes available under Section 504 "the
remedies, procedures and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964..."
Title VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l) directs federal departments and agencies extending "fed-
eral financial assistance" to promulgate rules under which funding will be terminated
for those entities that discriminate on prohibited grounds. Administrative procedures
have been created to terminate federal funding of recipients who fail to comply with
Section 504. See e.g., 49 CFR § 27-125 (providing for the "suspension of, or termination
of, or refusal to grant or to continue federal financial assistance" to entities that fail to
comply with Section 504 under programs administered by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion). Instructive is Doe v. Oster River Co-op Sch. Dist., 992 F.Supp 467, 483 (D. N.H.
1997) where the court found that instead of punitive damages, Congress provided a
"punitive-like sanction of terminating federal funding."
91. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
92. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court held for the first time that "when the remedial de-
vices provided in a particular act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id. at
20 (ruling section 1983 action precluded under Maritime Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, both of which permit private
rights of action against "any person"). This doctrine has been criticized. See Robert L.
Glicksman, Federal Preemption & Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PAL. REV. 121,
223 n.135 (1985) (describing the Supreme Court's analysis in Sea Clammers as "not fully
persuasive"); Myron Rumeld, No Preclusion of § 1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive
Statutory Remedial Schemes, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1183, 1183 (1982) (criticizing the Sea Clam-
mers decision as too restrictive); Richard B. Steward & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs
& Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1322 n.463 (1982) (criticizing the Sea Clammers
decision for barring damages actions that might promote efficiency under a statutory
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- "where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or reme-
dies, a court must be chary of reading others into it"9-3 - the court
in Moreno found that the remedies under Section 504 were suffi-
ciently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to pre-
clude punitive damages as an available remedy.
94
More significant, the court in Moreno observed that the Su-
preme Court in Alexander v. Choate95 had determined that most dis-
crimination against the handicapped is due to apathy, not
animus.96 The primary objective of Section 504 is the prevention of
tort approach); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 & the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49
U. CHi. L. REv. 394, 395-96 (1982) ("carried to its logical limit, Sea Clammers could lead
to a rule that the creation of an explicit enforcement mechanism invariably extin-
guishes the private right of action under § 1983."); Eric H. Zagrans, Under Color of What
Law: A Reconstructed Model of § 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. Rxv. 499, 598 n.67 (1985) ("Sea
Clammers represents yet another effort by the court to restrict the scope of 1983 liability
in order to limit the number of actions which can be brought in federal court."). It has
commonly been called the Sea Clammers preclusion doctrine.
In a federal system of government the supremacy clause of the Constitution, see
U.S. CONST., art. VI, necessarily has required development of a doctrine of preemption
of state laws wherever necessary to permit the proper functioning of federal enact-
ments. The proper scope of federal preemption is one of the most important often-
litigated issues across the entire spectrum of litigation. See e.g., El Al Israeli Airlines
Limited v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (airline tort litigation); Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (medical devices product liability litigation); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (tobacco litigation); Wood v. General
Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988) (automobile products liability litigation).
The problem with the Sea Clammers doctrine is that a very detailed subsequent enact-
ment by Congress places earlier statutes at risk of "preclusion," should a court deem
such a result warranted. Prior to Sea Clammers no court could impede enforcement of a
duly enacted federal statute short of taking the considered step of declaring the statute
unconstitutional. Under Sea Clammers, enforcement of older federal statutes may be
precluded by newer, more detailed statutes all without reference to specific legislative
history. Remember that the decision to "preclude" enforcement of an earlier statute is
made upon a review of the comprehensiveness of the latest statutory scheme on its face.
No review of legislative history is required or, apparently, encouraged. Some commen-
tators have labeled this as grading and "imperial judiciary."
93. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
94. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791-92.
95. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
96. Id. at 296. Allegations of discrimination against the handicapped ordinarily
encompass activity other than discriminatory treatment caused by prejudices. Com-
mentators have identified four types of discriminatory barriers that handicapped per-
sons may confront when seeking employment: (1) intentional discrimination for
reasons of social bias; (2) neutral standards with disparate impact; (3) surmountable
barriers to the impaired; and (4) insurmountable barriers to the impaired. Mark E.
Martin, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of
2003]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
discrimination against the handicapped which "was perceived by
Congress to be most often the product, not of individual animus,
but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference - or benign neg-
lect."9 7 Punitive damages are not necessary to punish "thoughtless-
ness."98  Finally, the court in Moreno, without significant
elaboration, concluded that allowing punitive damages would ex-
pand application of Section 504 liability beyond all "manageable
bounds.'99
2. The Availability of Punitive Damages as Discussed in
Burns-Vidlik v. Chandler.
The district court in Burns-Vidlik v. Chandler, observed that the
task of determining whether punitive damages were permitted
under Section 504, with an implied cause of action as its founda-
tion, "resemble [d] the plight of a prodigal son without a home."100
The court held that punitive damages were available under Section
504.101 The court supported this holding on two principle
grounds: (1) the general rule that courts had the power to award
all appropriate relief, including punitive damages, in a cause of ac-
tion brought pursuant to a federal statute; 10 2 and (2) a clear mes-
sage from Congress in the CRREA which abrogated states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Section 504 cases.' 03
The court acknowledged its authority under Franklin to pre-
sume the availability of the "full panoply" of remedies for Section
the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 883-84 (1980); see also, Prewitt v. U. S. Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305, n.19 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295.
98. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791. Additionally, the Moreno court expressed its hesitancy
in finding punitive damages as a remedy for Section 504 violations because of the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of punitive dam-
ages. Id. The Supreme Court has struggled with the constitutionality of punitive
damage awards in recent years. See e.g., BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
99. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791.
100. Burns-Vidlik v. Chandler, 980 F. Supp. 1144 (D.C. Hawaii 1997).
101. Id. at 1152.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court bolstered its holding by observing that the majority of courts
which had considered the issue found that punitive damages were available in Section
504 actions. Id. at 1147.
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504 unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. 10 4 A com-
mon understanding of the phrase "full panoply" involved all possi-
ble remedies, including punitive damages.
10 5
Next, the court in Burns-Vidlik focused on whether the phrase
"appropriate relief' used by the court in Franklin106 encompassed
punitive damages.107 The Burns-Vidlik court found that "appropri-
ate relief' as a phrase could not be subject to blanket rules such as
"no punitive damages" because what may be appropriate was fact
dependent and had to be determined on a case by case basis.
10 8
Relying upon Franklin, the court in Burns-Vidlik held that Sec-
tion 504 gives courts the power to award punitive damages if: (1)
there is no clear direction to the contrary by Congress; and (2) such
relief would be appropriate. 10 9 The court concluded that Congress
had not given a "clear direction" that it did not want courts to
award punitive damages to litigants in Section 504 cases. 110 To sup-
port this observation, the court noted that in 1985 the Supreme
Court decided that money damages for a Section 504 violation
104. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
105. Burns-Vidlik, 980 F. Supp at 1147-48. The court also concluded that the phrase
"full spectrum" of remedies included punitive damages. Id. at 1148. This understand-
ing was expressed by the Supreme Court in International Bhd of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442
U.S. 42, 53 (1979) J. Brennan, concurring) (noting that the general rule that permits
courts to award the "full panoply" of remedies and stating that "punitive damages, be-
ing one of these tools, thus are presumptively available for use in an appropriate
case."). In previous decisions, the court had indicated that punitive damages might be
awarded in appropriate circumstances in order to punish violations of constitutional
rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.1l (1978).
106. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
107. Burns-Vidlik, 980 F. Supp. at 1148.
108. Id. at 1148. See Reich v. Cambridge Port Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1190-91
(1st Cir. 1994) ("appropriate relief' includes punitive damages); Waid v. Merrill Area
Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
As part of its analysis, the court in Burns-Vidlik criticized the Sixth Circuit's analysis
of "appropriate relief" in Moreno. The Moreno court found that punitive damages were
not necessary to combat thoughtlessness. 99 F.3d at 792. The court in Burns-Vidlik
found no causal connection between the assumption that discrimination against the
handicapped occurred mostly out of thoughtlessness and the conclusion that the availa-
bility of punitive damages would make Section 504 unmanageable. 980 F. Supp. at
1151. The Burns-Vidlik court observed that punitive damages would not be awarded in
case involving thoughtlessness and, therefore, the court's concern in Moreno was unjus-
tified. Id.
109. Burns-Vidlik, 980 F. Supp. at 1149.
110. Id. at 1150.
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could not be collected against a state because of the Eleventh
Amendment."' In an atypical show of unity, in the following year,
Congress passed the CRREAt1 2 which: (1) abrogated states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity in Section 504 actions; and (2) held
that litigants shall have the same remedies against the state that
they would have against a private party.1 3 The court in Burns-Vidlik
saw this process as a clear message from Congress that money dam-
ages were vital to the workings of Section 504.114
Finally, the court in Burns-Vidlik found the analysis of the
Moreno court unpersuasive. Addressing the apparent anomalous sit-
uation under Section 501 where punitive damages are allowed and
Section 504 where they are not expressly allowed, 115 the court
noted that the cap on punitive damages in Section 501 did not ap-
ply to actions brought against the state. 116 Any inconsistency be-
tween Section 501 and Section 504 is "akin to the norm, and is not
anomalous."" 17 As an example, under the CRREA, Congress explic-
itly abrogated sovereign immunity in a Section 504 case but did not
abrogate sovereign immunity under Section 501.118
Dismissing the Moreno court's statement that other means ex-
isted to punish violators of Section 504, the court in Burns-Vidlik
indicated that such options do "nothing for the person who suf-
fered the indignities of discrimination. Thus, the court held that
111. Referencing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
113. Burns-Vidlik, 980 F. Supp. at 1150.
114. Id. A contrary "clear direction" was found by the Moreno court. The court in
Burns-Vidlik challenged this finding by the Moreno court. Specifically, the court in
Burns-Vidlik disputed the conclusion that because punitive damages under Section 504
or Title VI "had never been awarded" before 1992, Congress's failure to remedy the
situation was the equivalent of sending a "clear direction" that punitive damages should
not be allowed under Section 504. Moreno, 99 F.3d at 789-90. Some of the authorities
relied upon by the Moreno court were unclear on the issue. See e.g., Fitzgerald v. Green
Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (D.C. Iowa 1984) ("although puni-
tive damages are presumably available under Section 504, the court finds that the assess-
ment of such damages against defendant is not justified under the facts of this case.");
Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (full panoply of remedies
under Section 504 are available but could not be imposed against the state because of
the Eleventh Amendment).
115. See Moreno, 99 F.3d at 791-92.
116. Burns-Vidlik, 980 F. Supp. at 1150.
117. Id. at 1151.
118. Id.
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punitive damages should not be rejected because of other options
already available, but should be seen as another weapon in the fight
against discrimination." ' 19
III. PUNiTIrVE DAMAGES AND DISABILITY LEGISLATION.
In June 2002, the Supreme Court resolved the damages issue
in Barnes v. Gorman,120 and held that punitive damages are not "ap-
propriate relief' under the ADA and RA.121 In reaching this result,
the Court clarified, generally, the scope of remedies that had cre-
ated a split amongst the circuit courts. First, the Court observed
that Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA are enforce-
able through private causes of action. 122 Accordingly, the Court
found that the remedies for violations of these sections of the ADA
and RA are "coextensive with the remedies available in a private
cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
119. Burns-Vidlik, 980 F. Supp. at 1150.
120. 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
121. Id. at 189 ("Because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits
brought under Tide VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows that they may not be
awarded in suits brought under Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act.").
Punitive damages had not been awarded under Section 504 and were widely be-
lieved to be unavailable under that section. See e.g., Cortes v. Bd. of Governors, 766 F.
Supp. 623, 626 (N.D. IIl. 1991) ("there is insufficient reason to imply a punitive damage
remedy when Congress has given no indication whatsoever that it intended to authorize
such relief'); Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D. Mass. 1990) ("it is quite unlikely
... that Congress intended Section 504 to provide a windfall to plaintiffs in the form of
punitive damages"); Martin v. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. for Children, 599
F.Supp. 284 (E.D. Mont. 1984) ("punitive damages are clearly not available in an action
under Section 504"); Gelman v. Dep't. of Educ., 544 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D. Co. 1982)
(compensatory, but not punitive damages are available under Section 504). It was not
until 1994 that a court awarded punitive damages under Section 504. See Kedra v. Naza-
reth Hosp., 868 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Indeed, neither where punitive damages
thought to be available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the remedies of
which had been made available under Section 504. See e.g., Robinson v. English Dep't
of the Univ. of Pa., 1988 WL 120738 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("the prevailing view ex-
pressed in case law is that a private action under Title VI does not entitle a prevailing
plaintiff to general or punitive damages"); Singh v. Superintending Sch. Comm'n of the
City of Portland, 601 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D. Maine 1985) (allowing general, but not
punitive damages); Rendon v. Utah State Dep't of Employment Sec. Job Serv., 454 F.
Supp. 534 (D. Utah 1978) (no cause of action for general or punitive damages).
122. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 184.
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1964. ' ' 123 Second, the Court implicitly acknowledged that "the
traditional presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for viola-
tion of a federal right" was applicable in the ADA and RA con-
text. 124 Having set this foundation, the issue before the Court in
Gorman was the proper scope of "appropriate relief' under the ADA
and the RA 1
2 5
Analyzing Title VI as a springboard for resolving the scope of
remedies issue under the ADA and RA, the Court in Gorman began
its analysis by indicating that Title VI invokes Congress's Spending
Clause powers by placing conditions on the grant of federal
funds. 126 Title VI and other Spending Clause legislation is "in the
nature of a contract" because "in return for federal funds the [re-
cipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."'12
7
Building on this premise, the Court stated:
Just as a valid contract requires offer and acceptance of its
terms, "the legitimacy of Congress's power to legislate
under the spending power.. .rests on whether the [recipi-
ent] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
"contract".128
Under this contract-law analogy, the Court found that Congress
must unambiguously state each of the conditions that it has placed
on the grant of federal monies.' 29
Under the contract-law approach, a recipient of federal grants
"may be held liable to third-party beneficiaries for intentional con-
123. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 184. Although Title VI does not explicitly provide for a
private right of action, such a right of action had previously been held to be implied.
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703. The court in Gorman found that Congress acknowledged
this implied right of action in amendments to the statute, leaving it "beyond dispute
that private individuals may sue to enforce" Title VI. 122 S.Ct. at 2100 (citing Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)).
124. See Gorman, 536 U.S. at 184 (the court reiterated the application of this tradi-
tional presumption in Title VI cases and, therefore, by direct implication to ADA and
RA cases. Prior to Gorman the courts had relied on Franklin).
125. Id.
126. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 184 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 640 (1999) (Title IX)).
127. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 186 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984)).
128. Id.
129. Id. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; see also, Davis, 526 U.S. at 640; Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
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duct that violates the clear terms of the relevant statute."1 30 How-
ever, the recipient will not be held liable for failing to comply with
vague and imprecise statutory language describing legislative objec-
tives. 13 1 The Court in Gorman found this contract-law analogy appli-
cable in determining the scope of damages remedies.
132
The contractual nature of the ADA and RA "has implications
for [a court's] construction of the scope of available remedies."'
133
One such implication, according to the Court in Gorman, "is that a
remedy is 'appropriate relief ... only if the funding recipient is on
notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability
of that nature.' "134 The Court in Gorman explained that "[a] fund-
ing recipient is generally on notice that it is subject not only to
those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but
also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach of
contract."'1 5 Where a statute contains no express remedies, a recip-
ient of federal funds could be "subject to suit for compensatory
damages136 and injunction, 13 7 [which are] forms of relief tradition-
ally available in suits for breach of contract.' 38 However, "punitive
damages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are gener-
ally not available for breach of contract."' 39
The Court in Gorman concluded that because an implied puni-
tive damages provision could not reasonably be found in Title VI, it
logically followed that punitive damages could not be awarded in
suits brought under Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the
RA.140 The Court stated:
130. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 at 287).
134. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187 (quoting Franklin 503 U.S. 60 at 73) (emphasis in
original).
135. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187.
136. Id. (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76).
137. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187; (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 711-712).
138. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357
(1981), 3 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1445-1450 (1920) and J. POMEROY, A
TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 1-5 (1879)).
139. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187 (citing 3 E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, 192-201
(2d ed. 1998), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, and 1 T. SEDGWCK, MEA-
SURE OF DAMAGES § 370 (8th ed. 1891)).
140. Id. at 189.
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Our conclusion is consistent with the "well settled" rule
that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such inva-
sion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done." (citations omitted) When a fed-
eral-funds recipient violates conditions of Spending
Clause legislation, the wrong done is the failure to pro-
vide what the contractual obligation requires; and that
wrong is "made good" when the recipient compensates the
federal government or a third-party beneficiary... for the
loss caused by that failure ... Punitive damages are not
compensatory, and are therefore not embraced within
the rule described in Bell.
14 1
The Court in Gorman observed that reasonably implied con-
tractual terms are those that "comport with community standards of
fairness. ' 14 2 The Court then noted that under some legislative en-
actments, compensatory damages alone "might well exceed a recipi-
ent's level of federal funding."143 Therefore, allowing "punitive
damages on top of that could well be disastrous. " 1 44 Indeed, this
contract-law approach was a marked departure from the lower
Courts' varying approaches to the scope of remedies available
under the RA.'
45
141. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 189 (citing Bell v. Hood 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
142. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d.)
143. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 188 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).
144. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 188. ("Not only is it doubtful that funding recipients
would have agreed to exposure to such unorthodox and indeterminate liability; it is
doubtful whether they would even have accepted the funding if punitive damages was a
required condition .... [I]t can hardly be said that community standards of fairness
support such an implication.")
145. Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
Because the Gorman Court based its decision on a contract-law approach, it did not
address the traditional presumption against imposition of punitive damages on govern-
ment entities as addressed in the seminal Newport case. Id.at 261. Applying Newport to
the facts of Gorman may not have garnered a similar result. In concluding that punitive
damages were not available against a municipality, the Court in Newport noted that mu-
nicipal immunity from punitive damages was well established at common law by 1871.
Id. at 263-64. Futher, the court stated that Congress never intended on abolishing mu-
nicipality immunity when enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 263-264.
However, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress specifically provided
that punitive damages were not available against a government, a government agency or
political subdivision for Section 501 violations and was silent on Section 504 violations.
42 U.S.C.S. § 1981a(b)(1). Thus, Congress clearly indicated that it had no intent in
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If Congress disagrees with Gorman's holding that punitive dam-
ages are not available under the ADA and RA, it can rectify the
situation by amending both the ADA and RA so that there is an
unequivocal waiver of state sovereign immunity from punitive dam-
ages. Congress's failure to amend these twin statutes may be inter-
preted by courts as acquiescing to the Gorman decision regarding
the scope of available remedies.
14 6
IV. THE RA AND ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY.
A. Abrogating Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
Congress enacted the Eleventh Amendment 47 to delineate the
scope of sovereign immunity reserved by the states. 148 The Elev-
enth Amendment guarantees that "non-consenting states may not
abolishing state sovereign immunity as to punitive damages in the context of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. As explained by the Gorman court, because the remedies under the
ADA and RA are coextensive to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, it stands to reason based
upon a Newport analysis that punitive damages are not available against a state or its
political subdivisions for ADA and RA violations because Congress similarly did not
intend on abrograting a state's sovereign immunity from punitive damages by its vague
references to appropriate remedies. See Gorman, 536 U.S. at 187.
146. Similarly, Congress can, if it so chooses, override the Garrett decision by reaf-
firming the enactment of both the ADA and the RA with specific findings that states
have particularly discriminated against the disabled. Whether there is evidence of such
state discrimination is a subject of another discussion reserved for a later date.
147. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST., amend. XI.
148. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999) (referring to the history of the
amendment as described in 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIS-
TORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926)). The United States is founded upon the concept of dual sover-
eignty. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). States hold sovereignty
concurrently with the federal government subject only to those limitations imposed by
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Tafflin v.Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
458 (1990).
Congress did not explicitly memorialize the full breadth of the sovereign immunity
retained by the states when the United States Constitution was ratified. Alden, 527 U.S.
at 723 (1999). Instead, in ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, Congress chose to ad-
dress only the specific historical concerns it faced in 1793 when the United States Su-
preme Court erroneously held that Article III of the Constitution authorized citizens of
one state to sue another state in Federal Court. Id at 719-20. Consequently, the Su-
preme Court has concluded that the language contained in the Eleventh Amendment
is only one particular exemplification of the states' sovereign immunity. Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e have understood the Elev-
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be sued by private individuals in federal court."149 Thus, states are
immune from suits brought in federal court by their own citizens as
well as citizens of other states. 150
Congress may lawfully abrogate state sovereign immunity pur-
suant to its enforcement powers provided for in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but must: (1) act "pursuant to a valid ex-
ercise of power"; and (2) "unequivocally express its intent to abro-
gate the immunity."'151 The Supreme Court in City of Boerne v.
F/ores152 formulated the "congruence and proportionality" test to
determine whether Congress's exercise of its enforcement power
was remedial and appropriate or definitional and not appropri-
ate.' 53 The Court stated that "[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."'
54
Applying the "congruency and proportionality test," the Su-
preme Court recently held in Board of Trustees of the University of Ala-
bama v. Garrett155 that suits against states by citizens seeking
damages under the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.' 56 The Court concluded that the enactment of the ADA was
enth Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of
our constitutional structure which it confirms").
149. Board of Tr. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). See
also, Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (applying Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by private
individuals in state courts based upon federal causes of action); Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775
(1991) (applying Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by Indian tribes); Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (applying Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits
by foreign nations); Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (applying Eleventh
Amendment to admiralty proceedings); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (applying
Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by federal corporations); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890) (applying Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by citizens of the state under fed-
eral-question jurisdiction).
150. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-6 (1974). See also, Garrett, 531 U.S. 356;
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 15 (1890).
151. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (citing Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
152. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
153. Id. at 520.
154. Id. at 520, 530 ("The appropriateness of remedial measures must be consid-
ered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm
may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.")
155. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
156. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358-59.
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not a proper exercise of Congress's authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, Congress did not properly
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the
ADA.1
57
The Garrett Court first began its analysis by observing that the
disabled are an unprotected class under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment1 58 and that any legislation
affecting such individuals would receive only the minimum "ra-
tional basis" review applicable to general, social and economic legis-
lation. 159 "[I]f there is a rational relationship between the disparity
of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose," then the
selected classification "cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection
clause." 1
60
The Garrett Court next examined whether the congressional
record demonstrated a history and pattern of unconstitutional em-
ployment discrimination by the states against the disabled. 161 The
Court concluded that the congressional record supporting the en-
actment of the ADA failed to identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination and employment practices targeted against the dis-
157. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358-59.
158. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections
of the law." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
159. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363; See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440-42 (1985) (Rationale basis review is the least demanding review for the courts.
Courts apply a different level of scrutiny based upon whether the state classification
involves a fundamental right or is based upon a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.
Suspect classifications include classifications based upon race, national origin, and, for
some purposes, alienage. Courts will utilize a higher standard of review ("strict scru-
tiny") when the state classification is based upon a suspect classification. The state clas-
sification will only be upheld under the strict scrutiny standard if the classification is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Courts will utilize a middle
level standard of review when the state classification is based upon a quasi-suspect classi-
fication; for example, gender, mental retardation, or illegitimacy. The state classifica-
tion will only be upheld if the means chosen by the state is substantially related to an
important governmental objective. The ordinary standard of review applies when the
state classification is not based upon a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classification and
does not impair a fundamental right. Under this ordinary standard of review, a court
will uphold the classification if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental objection.).
160. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
161. Id.
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abled 1 62 The Garret Court noted that Congress only made a "gen-
eral finding" that "historically, society has tended to isolate and
separate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improve-
ments, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem."1 63
Because Congress assembled only minimal evidence of unconstitu-
tional state discrimination in employment against the disabled, the
Court concluded that the rights and remedies created by the ADA
were greater than those justified by application of the rational basis
standard. 164 Consequently, the Garrett Court held that enactment
of the ADA was not an appropriate exercise of congressional au-
thority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that
Congress's abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
was ineffective.
65
The Supreme Court's analysis in Garrett should also apply to
Section 504 because the ADA and the RA are twin statutes.166 The
RA's congressional record is significantly smaller and contains sub-
stantially less evidence and fewer findings than the ADA's congres-
sional record. 167  Therefore, the same legislative findings and
analysis that supported the Supreme Court's conclusion in Garrett
should also support a similar conclusion that Congress exceeded its
authority in abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity under the RA. 168
162. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366. See also, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89
(2000) ("Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States,
much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation.").
163. 531 U.S. at 369 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)). The congressional record
revealed that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabili-
ties," and that states employed more than 4,500,000 Americans when the ADA was en-
acted. Id. at 370.
164. Id. at 373-4.
165. Id.
166. See Maull v. Division of State Police, 141 F. Supp.2d 463, 471-72 (D. Del. 2001)
(declining to dismiss plaintiffs Section 504 claims under Garrett, because Garrett did not
address the RA).
167. Pugliese v. Arizona Dep't of Health and Human Services, 147 F. Supp. 2d 985,
988-89.
168. Lower courts applying the Garrett analysis have concluded that congressional
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment under the RA was ineffective. See, e.g., Crocker
v. Lewiston Police Dept., 2001 WL 114977 (D. ME. Feb. 9, 2001) ("the substantive stan-
dards for determining liability under the ADA [and] the Rehabilitation Act ... are the
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B. The Spending Clause and the RA.
Notwithstanding the Garrett Court's conclusion that Congress
can not directly abrogate a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to
its Section 5 powers, an interesting conundrum exits: can Congress
create a waiver of sovereign immunity through the Spending Clause
after Garrett?169 The Spending Clause gives Congress the power to
"lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and welfare of the United
States. 1 70 Congress is under no obligation to use its Spending
Clause power to disburse funds to the states. Thus, disbursements
of federal funds to states are considered gifts.' 71 In addition, Con-
gress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and may
require that a state waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity when
the state participates in federal spending programs.
1 72
However, Congress does not have unlimited use of its Spend-
ing Clause power.173 Courts have imposed at least four general re-
strictions.174 First, the exercise Congress's Spending Clause power
same and ... case law interpreting either federal statute is applicable to [both].");
Allison v. Department of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1996) ("because the
same basic standards and definitions are used under both Acts, cases interpreting either
are applicable and interchangeable for purposes of our discussion."). See also, Ortiz v.
Fajardo, 133 F. Supp.2d 143, 150 n.6 (D.P.R. 2001) (holding that "plaintiffs claims
under the Rehabilitation Act, although barred under motion to dismiss standard be-
cause of lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the merits would have suf-
fered the same treatment of dismissal as to monetary damages based on the cases of
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, [citation omitted] and Kimel v.
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, (2000)"); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 158 F. Supp.2d 539 (E.D.
Pa. May 31, 2001) as amended by order (June 5, 2001), reconsideration denied, (July 31,
2001) ("Congress did not validly abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the RA - Congress failed to identify a pattern of discrimination by the states
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment and failed to establish that the remedy im-
posed by the RA is congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.").
169. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue: see generally, Steven Plitt, Valerie
Fasolo, & Daniel Maldonado, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett: Is
Constitutional Authority for Sale and Is State Sovereign Immunity the Purchase Price? 13 GEO.
MASON. U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 151 (Spring 2003).
170. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
171. College Savings Bank. v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Ed. Exp. Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686-
87 (1999).
172. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985).
173. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 & n.13.
174. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
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must be in pursuit of "the general welfare."1 75 Second, Congress
must unambiguously condition a state's receipt of federal funds in
order for the state to exercise its choice knowingly; cognizant of the
consequences of its participation in a federal spending program. 1 76
Third, a condition imposed on the receipt of federal funds may be
illegitimate if the condition is unrelated "to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs." 17 7 Finally, other provi-
sions in the Constitution may provide an independent bar to condi-
tioning the receipt of federal funds.
178
The Spending Clause could unreasonably expand congres-
sional power while correspondingly diminishing the states' sover-
eignty. 179 Justice O'Connor expressed such concerns in South
Dakota v. Dole:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress's
notion of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast
financial resources of the federal government, is that the
Spending Clause gives "power to the Congress to tear
down the barriers, to invade the state's jurisdiction, and
to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to
no restrictions save such as are self-imposed." This, of
course, . . . was not the Framer's plan and it is not the
meaning of the Spending Clause. 180
Because "financial inducements" offered by Congress can be so
coercive as to cross the point where pressure turns the condition
into compulsion, scholars have posited that the use of the Spending
175. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65.
176. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17.
177. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion);
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) ("[T]he Federal Gov-
ernment may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in
the project and to the over-all objectives thereof").
178. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, n.34 (1968);
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
179. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) ("As the Federal Govern-
ment's willingness to exercise power within the confines of the Constitution has grown,
the authority of the States has correspondingly diminished to the extent that federal
and state policies have conflicted.").
180. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at
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Clause power is limited to imposing constitutional conditions. 181
Consequently, Congress should not be able to impose a condition
on the receipt of federal funds that either: (1) directly violates a
constitutional right or (2) disrupts concepts of federalism.18 2 This
idea is known as the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions."18 3 If
Congress imposes a condition upon the receipt of federal funds
that violates the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," then the
condition is unconstitutional regardless of the state's consent.
18 4
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Garrett con-
cluded that Congress exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment when it abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the ADA. However, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue of whether a state waives its right to assert Elev-
enth Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds in the con-
text of the RA. Because the ADA has no federal funding
requirement, the Garrett Court did not need to address the issue of
whether Congress can achieve a waiver indirectly through its Spend-
ing Clause power when Congress cannot constitutionally achieve it
directly.18 5 Lower courts, however, are divided on the issue.18 6
181. See AlbertJ. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending & the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 1103 (1987).
182. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
183. Koslow v.Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 174 (3rd Cir. 2002) ("The 'unconstitu-
tional conditions' doctrine is based on the proposition that government incentives may
be inherently coercive.").
184. Id.
185. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has used the
coercive power of the purse to limit state's historic powers. City of Columbus v. Ours
Garage & Wreckerservice, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 449 at n.2 (2002) ("But in any event, a
siphoning off of the States' 'historic powers' to delegate has equally been achieved,
whether it has come about through the coercion of deprivation of Spending Clause
funds or through other means.")
186. Compare, Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Arkansas Board of Education waived immunity to Section 504 claims and affirming
that Congress may require states to waive sovereign immunity in exchange for receiving
federal funds); and In Re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[A] waiver may
be found in a state's acceptance of federal funds with conditions attached.") with Garcia
v. S.U.N.Y. Health Serv. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 114 (2nd Cir. 2001) (S.U.N.Y. did not know-
ingly waive its sovereign immunity against suit under the RA when it accepted federal
funds); and Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 158 F. Supp.2d 539, 543-44
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (employee could not show that state employer validly waived its Elev-
enth Amendment immunity from suit under RA, even though employer received fed-
eral funds); and New Holland Village Condo. v. Destaso Enters. Ltd., 139 F. Supp.2d
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Conditioning the receipt of federal funds on a state's waiver of
its Eleventh Amendment immunity disrupts concepts of federalism
because it unconstitutionally diminishes or impairs a state's sover-
eign powers. Federalism would become a hodge-podge quilt of un-
equal states that surrender their state sovereignty incrementally and
differentially depending upon the federal monies they accept as a
result of their dire financial straits.1 8 7 As such, a conditioned waiver
of a state's sovereign immunity is an unconstitutional condition and
is unenforceable regardless of whether the state consents by ac-
cepting federal funds.
V. PURSUING RA VIOLATIONS AS A SECTION 1983 CLAIM.
In addition to bringing a private action for violations of Sec-
tion 504, a victim of discrimination may be able to bring a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) for a violation of the RA. Section
1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the
United States Constitution or federal statutes, if the violations were
committed under color of state law.188 As a general rule, a Section
1983 claim can be predicated solely on a violation of a federal stat-
499 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("there is little, if any, room under this stringent standard ... for
the sort of 'constructive' waiver of immunity that plaintiff asks this court to apply based
on [defendant's] receipt of federal funds under the Act.").
187. See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (holding that constitutional
equality of the states is essential to the harmonious operation of the dual sovereignty
system of the United States).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
The United States Supreme Court has held that there were three aims in enacting
Section 1983: (1) to override certain state laws; (2) to provide a federal remedy when
state law was inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy when the state remedy,
though adequate in theory was not available in practice. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
173-5 (1961).
Section 1983 itself does not create substantive rights, but provides a "procedure of
redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d
137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove
that: (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States and (2) the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under
color of State law. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
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ute.' 8 9 However, there are two exceptions to the general rule. 90
The first exception provides that a Section 1983 claim based solely
on violations of a federal statute is unavailable where Congress has
foreclosed a Section 1983 remedy through a sufficiently compre-
hensive remedial and enforcement apparatus in the underlying fed-
eral statute.19 ' A Section 1983 claim is also unavailable where the
statute at issue is "the kind that created enforceable 'rights' under
Section 1983."192 Federal courts look to the statute's remedial mea-
sures to determine whether Congress intended to foreclose the Sec-
tion 1983 remedy for rights created by a federal statute.193 If a
federal statute has extensive and expressed remedies, then it is
likely that "Congress intended.. .to supplant any remedy that would
otherwise be available under Section 1983."'
194
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has held that Section 504
has limited remedies for victims of discrimination and does not
contain a remedial structure sufficiently comprehensive to evince a
congressional intent to preclude Section 1983 claims. 195 Indeed,
several courts in addition to the Ninth Circuit, have held that a
189. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
190. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
19 (1981).
191. Id. at 19-20 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28
(1981)).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Chi-
cago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Since Title VI provides its own
remedial scheme, we hold that private actions based on Title VI may not be brought
under § 1983.").
194. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 21. Some Circuit Courts, however, have declined to find
that other similar statutes preclude a Section 1983 claim when the Section 1983 claim is
based directly on a constitutional violation, and not a statutory violation. See, e.g., Dis-
covery House, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that ADA and RA did not preclude Section 1983 claim based upon a equal
protection violation).
195. See Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding the RA did
not preclude Section 1983 claim based upon violation of First Amendment). See also,
Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 520 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that Section 504 "con-
fers substantive rights but provides no exclusive remedies"); Conlon v. City of Long
Beach, 676 F. Supp. 1289, 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("§ 504 [is] not so comprehensive as to
'[leave] no room for additional private remedies under § 1983.'" (citing Wright v. Roa-
noke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987))).
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claimant can bring both a Section 504 claim and a Section 1983
claim. 196 Other courts have held to the contrary.197
196. See Moore v. Warwick Public School Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1986)
(suggesting that claims can be brought under Section 504 and Section 1983); Lutz v.
Weld County School Dist. No. 6, 784 F.2d 340, 341 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that claims
were brought under both provisions); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658
F.2d 1372, 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (permitting claims under both Section 504 and Sec-
tion 1983); Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 716 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding
that RA is not a comprehensive statute, but leaves room for additional private remedies
under section 1983) (citations omitted); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp.
654, 659-60 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that RA did not preclude Section 1983 claim).
In contrast, federal courts have held that Title VII's comprehensive remedial
scheme precludes a Section 1983 claim based upon violations of Title VII. Day v.
Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1984) ("However, we do
not read this language as expressing an intent that where employer conduct violates
only Title VII, which created new rights and remedies for public employees, an ag-
grieved employee may sue under both Title VII and § 1983."); Alexander v. Chicago
Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Since Title VI provides its own remedial
scheme, we hold that private actions based on Title VI may not be brought under
§ 1983."); Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir.1991) ("[S]ection
1983 cannot be used to assert the violation of rights created only by Title VII.").
The Fifth Circuit Court in Lakowski not only reviewed the remedial scheme of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., but also Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in determining whether Congress
intended to preclude a Section 1983 claim based upon a Title IX violation. Lakoski v.
James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995). Although the Fifth Circuit held that Title IX does
not provide a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to indicate by itself a con-
gressional intent to foreclose a Section 1983 based upon Title IX violations, the court
held that to focus exclusively on Title IX's remedies would ignore the larger federal
scheme and the remedies provided by Title VII. Id. at 755. Instead, the court con-
cluded that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for violations of the rights created by Title
VII itself. Id. (relying upon Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
378 (1979) (in which the court held that Title VII preempts § 1985 actions alleging
violations of Title VII rights)). The court went on to hold that, in enacting Title IX,
Congress intended to bolster the enforcement mechanism of Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, but that Con-
gress did not intend Title IX to create a mechanism by which individuals could circum-
vent Title VII remedies. Id. at 757. Because there is compelling evidence that Title IX
prohibits the same employment discrimination practices proscribed by Title VII, the
Fifth Circuit held that discrimination victims may not assert Title IX violations either
directly or derivatively through Section 1983. Id.
The reasoning in Lawoski stands in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit court's rea-
soning in Smith. Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330. Smith involved a Section 1983 claim
arising out of a First Amendment violation (right of association) and not a Section 504
based claim. Id. The Eighth Circuit has addressed a similar issue of whether the reme-
dies created in the Americans with Disabilities Act combined with the remedies availa-
ble in the RA preclude a Section 1983 claim based upon violations of those statutes.
Davis v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 104 F.3d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Furthermore, the
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VI. THE AVAILABILITY OF JURY TRIALS FOR RA VIOLATIONS.
Section 504 does not delineate the procedures involved in
bringing an RA claim. As an example, Section 504 is silent with
regard to the availability of a jury trial. An analysis of the statute
itself must first be made to determine whether the statute expresses
an intent to grant a jury trial. 198 An analysis of the statute's legisla-
tive history is also determined. 19 9 Several courts have held that the
right to a jury trial does not explicitly exist under Section 504.200
However, the "remedies, procedures, and rights" available under
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms provided under § 504 and the ADA suggest
Congress did not intend violations of those statutes to be also cognizable under
§ 1983.").
197. Davis, 104 F.3d at 206.
198. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987) ("Before initiating the
inquiry into the applicability of the Seventh Amendment, '[w]e recognize, of course,
the 'cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.'")
(quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974)); See generally Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1977).
199. Waldrop v. Southern Co. Serv., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 157 (11th Cir. 1994).
200. Federal courts interpreting Section 504 have held that it does not provide a
right to trial by jury. See e.g., Smith, 914 F.2d at 1336; Rivera Flores v. Puerto Rico Tele.
Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 71 (D.P.R. 1991); Jenkins v. Skinner, 771 F. Supp. 133, 135-36
(E.D. Va. 1991); Ahonen v. Frank, 769 F. Supp. 298, 299 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Shuttleworth
v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 661 (S.D. Fla. 1986). But see, Rivera-Flores v.
Puerto Rico Tele. Co., 64 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting right to jury trial in RA
claim).
In Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981), the Supreme Court addressed a simi-
lar situation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2003) ("ADEA"). Section 7(c) of the ADEA authorized lawsuits for age discrimination
against private employers and also expressly provided the right to ajury trial. In 1974,
Congress amended the ADEA and expanded its reach by adding state and local govern-
ments as potential defendants to Section 7(c). Congress subjected the state and local
governments to the same enforcement procedures as private employers. Congress also
broadened the ADEA by proscribing age discrimination by the federal government.
Congress enacted Section 15 of the ADEA which was a distinct statutory scheme that did
not expressly include the right to ajury trial. The difference in Congress's treatment of
the federal government led to the Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress intended
that enforcement against the federal government be distinct from enforcement against
private employers and state and local governments. Specifically, the Supreme Court
held that persons suing the federal government would not have the right to ajury trial.
453 U.S. at 162-68.
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Title VI apply to violations of Section 504. Title VI also does not
contain an express grant of a jury trial.
20 1
The analysis of whether Section 504 permits a right to jury trial
does not end, however, with a determination that Section 504 or
Title VI do not expressly provide for jury trials. The next step in
the analysis is to determine whether a jury trial is required by the
Constitution itself. The Seventh Amendment guarantees ajury trial
"in Suits at common law, where the value and controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars . . ,,202 The Seventh Amendment guarantees
the right to ajury trial to all lawsuits where legal rights are involved,
whether at common law or arising under federal legislation.
203
In Tull v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that the
Seventh Amendment also requires ajury trial in those actions that
are "analogous to Suits at common law."20 4 The Tull Court ob-
served: "First, we compare the statutory action to eighteenth cen-
tury actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of
the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy
sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature."20 5
A private action under Section 504 had been characterized as a type
of tort or contract action for which suits at law were available, if the
proper type of damages were requested.20 6 The Supreme Court in
201. Doe v. Regional 13 Med. Health - Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402, 1407 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the remedies.., and rights available under Title VI,
like those under Title VII, are essentially equitable in nature and the 'procedures' avail-
able do not include juries.").
202. U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
203. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
204. 481 U.S. at 417. A plaintiff is not entitled to ajury trial if defendants are sued
in their official capacity as representatives of the United States. Crawford v. Runyon, 79
F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1996); Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160-61 (holding that Seventh Amend-
ment right to jury trial does not apply to lawsuits against the federal government and
holding that plaintiff has right to jury trial involving the federal government "only
where Congress has affirmatively and unambiguously granted that right by statute").
205. Curtis, 481 U.S. at 417-18.
206. See e.g., Smith, 914 F.2d at 1337. The Ninth Circuit in Smith noted that there
were no discrimination actions at common law and that a Section 504 claim is closely
analogous either to an 18th-century tort action or an action brought to enforce an
express or implied employment contract. Both 18th-century actions could have been
brought in either courts of law or courts of equity, depending on the relief sought. Id.
at 1337 (citing Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Consid-
erations, 48 Mo. L. REv. 855, 858-62 (1983) (providing historical background of the
employment-at-will doctrine, and the evolution of employee protection)). See also Cur-
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Tull held that categorizing the relief sought is "more important"
than finding a precisely analogous common law cause of action in
determining whether the Seventh Amendment gurarantees a jury
trial. 2
07
"Money damages are the classic form of legal relief."20 8 Equita-
ble relief generally refers to injunctions, writs of mandamus, and
writs of restitution. 20 9 Not all awards for monetary damages consti-
tute legal relief.210 The primary exception to the general rule that
monetary damages are legal in nature are restitutionary damages,
which are considered equitable in nature. 211 Courts originally con-
sidered back pay a form of restitution and, therefore, an equitable
remedy. 212 The Supreme Court's recent trend; however, is to con-
sider back pay a legal remedy.2
13
Therefore, if a plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages, the
right to a jury trial arises from the Seventh Amendment and not
Section 504 because the relief sought is legal in nature. 214 If a plain-
tiff is seeking only equitable relief, the right to a jury trial is not
tis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.10 ("An action to redress racial discrimination may also be likened
to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress.").
207. Curtis, 481 U.S. at 421.
208. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (citing DAN B. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1 at 3 (1973)) (emphasis in original),
209. Id. at 258.
210. Id. Courts liberally construe whether a remedy is legal in nature. Waldp, 24
F.3d at 157 (citing Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 49 n.7 (1989)).
211. Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 157. Restitution is as an equitable remedy designed to
cure unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION general scope note at 1
(1937) (rep. 1962); DOBBS, supra note 206, § 1.1, at 1-2.
212. Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 157 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
415-19 (1975), for proposition that Supreme Court characterized back pay awarded
under Title VII as equitable in context of assessing whether judge erred in refusing to
award such relief).
213. Id. (citing Wooddell v. IBEW, 502 U.S. 93 (1991), for proposition that Su-
preme Court characterized back pay as compensatory damages at law). See also DOBBS,
supra note 206, § 2.6, at 69 n. 18 and § 12.25, at 924-27 (1973) (noting that back pay "is
precisely the claim available as damages to any discharged employee" and discussing
back pay as a legal remedy); 1 ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK &JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 3, at 3 (1920) (noting that "[e]quity... gives specific relief
by decreeing the very thing to be done which was agreed to be done.... But, as a
general rule, it refrains from awarding pecuniary reparation for damage sustained.").
214. Smith, 914 F.2d at 1338.
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available. 215 In addition, ajury trial is unavailable for equitable re-
lief even in a lawsuit seeking monetary damages. 216
VII. THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR RA VIOLATIONS.
A. Statue of Limitations Based Upon Forum State's
Personal Injury Statute.
Section 504, like several civil rights statutes, does not set forth
any applicable statute of limitations. 217 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) pro-
vides for the selection of an appropriate common-law statute of lim-
itations which is most applicable to the federal action. 218 Section
1988 encompasses "a three-step process" in determining the statute
of limitations applicable to civil rights claims.219 First, courts must
look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws are suitable
to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.
'2 20
Second, if no suitable federal rule exists, then courts must consider
application of state "common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes" of the forum state.221 Third, in asserting
215. Smith, 914 F.2d at 1338.
216. Id. But see Cortes, 766 F. Supp. at 626 (right to jury trial under Seventh Amend-
ment available even if plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages as well as equitable
relief for intentional discrimination).
217. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (noting that Congress's failure
to enact federal legislation with statute of limitations is commonplace).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) provides in relevant part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts. .for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the States wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil
... case is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. ...
219. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267.
220. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984). The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1658, the general federal statute of limitations, is not
applicable to a Section 504 claim. Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d
222, 223 (4th Cir. 1993).
221. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48.
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the federal interest as predominant, courts can apply state law only
if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 2
22
In addressing this "three-step process" in a Section 1983 action,
the Supreme Court held that the broad purposes underlying Sec-
tion 1983 and the variety of claims encompassed under it closely
resembled tort actions for the recovery of personal injuries.2 23 The
Supreme Court also held that "[t] he federal interests in uniformity,
certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation" require
the selection of a single statute of limitations from each state to
govern all Section 1983 claims. 224 The Supreme Court in Wilson
upheld the Tenth Circuit's application of Section 1988 in determin-
ing that the forum's state statute of limitations governing personal
injuries and injuries to reputation applied to a Section 1983
claim.
225
Section 504 is an anti-discrimination statute similar to Section
1983.226 In applying the "three-step process" contained in Section
1988 to Section 504 claims, lower courts have also applied the fo-
rum state's personal injury statute of limitations because Section
504 claims concern injuries to individuals, and are analogous to
personal injury claims. 227 When the forum state has enacted a
222. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48.
223. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276. The Supreme Court also applied this rationale to
Section 1981 claims. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987).
224. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
225. Id. at 279. Courts have long held that the most closely analogous state statute
of limitations will apply to determine the timeliness of claims made under statutes to
which no prescribed limitation period exists. See e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482
U.S. 656 (1987); Morse v. University of Vt., 973 F.2d 122, 125 (2nd Cir. 1992). As a
general principle, the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions is
utilized. Kirk v. Cromvich, 629 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 1980); Piquard v. City of East
Peoria, 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Noel v. Cornell Univ. Med. College, 853 F.
Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). However, federal law determines accrual of the cause of
action. Rubin v. O'Karen, 621 F.2d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1980);Jackson v. Nicoletti, 875 F.
Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Long v. Board of Educ. of City of Phila., 812 F. Supp.
525, 531 (E.D. Pa.), afjfd without opinion, 8 F.3d 811 (3rd Cir. 1993).
226. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir.
1987) (Section 504 is a "civil rights statute . . . closely analogous to section 1983.");
Morse, 973 F.2d at 127 ("Like § 1983, § 504 may also be described as 'conferring a gen-
eral remedy for injuries to personal rights.'") (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 278).
227. See, e.g., Everett v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407 (lth Cir. 1998);
Southerland v. Hardaway Management Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994); Baker v.
Board of Regents of State of Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 631 (10th Cir. 1993); Bush v. Com-
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counterpart to the RA, the statute of limitations of the forum's state
counterpart, and not the personal injury statute, is the most analo-
gous and, therefore, the most appropriate limitations period.
228
Where a forum state's statute of limitations is borrowed, then
the forum state's rules for tolling the statute are also borrowed. 2 29
For example, when a lawsuit alleges discrimination on grounds of a
mental illness, the traditional rule that the mental illness tolls a stat-
ute of limitations applies only if the illness in fact prevents the
claimant from managing his affairs and thus from understanding
his legal rights and acting upon them.
23 0
B. Statute of Limitations Based Upon the ADA's
Administrative Requirements.
An interesting issue related to the appropriate statute of limita-
tion arises because the ADA imposes an administrative filing re-
quirement as a prerequisite to pursuing claims privately, but the RA
does not.23 1 A claimant alleging a violation of the ADA must file a
monwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1993); Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist.,
976 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1992); Morse, 973 F.2d at 127; Hall v. Knott County Bd. of
Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 409-10 (6th Cir. 1991).
228. Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 1993)
(applying analogous Virginia state statute modeled after RA for statute of limitations
period and not personal injury statute). The District Court in Wolsky looked to the
other circuits that had addressed the question and found that they had applied the
local personal injury statute of limitations. Wolsky v. Easterm Virginia Med. Auth., 795
F. Supp. 171 (E.D.Va. 1992). In those cases, however, either the states in which the
actions arose did not have parallel state statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of handicap or the statutes did not provide a limitations period so that the more gen-
eral personal injury statute was the most closely analogous statute from which to bor-
row. Id. at 174. The circuit court in Wolsky agreed that the analytic process brought
them to the conclusion that a RA claim is essentially a personal injury action in statutory
form, but because Virginia had clearly enacted a parallel state statute and provided a
statute of limitations for it, the court decided that the Virginia Act would be the most
appropriate limitation. 1 F.3d at 224.
229. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980) ("'[B]orrowing'
[of statutes of limitations] logically included rules of tolling. .. ").
230. Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996); Lawson v. Glover, 957 F.2d
801, 805 (lth Cir. 1987); Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1987); Dau-
tremont v. Broadlawns Hospital, 827 F.2d 291, 296 (8th Cir. 1987); Lopez v. Citibank,
N.A., 808 F.2d 905, 906-07 (1st Cir. 1987); Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 523
(Iowa 1995).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e) (1). This statute "specifies with precision" the pre-
requisites that must be met before a private lawsuit can be filed. Alexander v. Gardner-
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charge within the statutory time period and serve notice upon the
person against whom the charge is made. Where a state agency has
authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful
practice, an employee who initially files a grievance with that
agency has 300 days within which to file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regarding the
employment practice. In those states that do not have a state
agency with concurrent employment responsibility, the charge
must be filed within 180 days. In a state having an entity authorized
to grant or seek relief regarding the unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice, an employee who initially files a grievance with that state
agency must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the
employment practice. 232 In other states, the charge must be filed
within 180 days.23 3 Thus, a party must file a charge within either
180 or 300 days of the date that a discrete or discriminatory act
"occurred" or lose the ability to recover for it.234 There is a second
administrative time barrier set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f) (1).
In order to bring a claim pursuant to the ADA, a plaintiff must file
suit in district court within 90 days of receipt of his or her notice of
right to sue from the EEOC. This 90 day requirement is mandatory
and jurisdictional. 235 If the aggrieved party does not file an action
within this prescribed time period, federal courts have no power to
entertain the action.236 In the absence of a recognized equitable
consideration, the court cannot extend the limitation period by
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). The ADA incorporates the procedural require-
ments of Title 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) which provides:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in § ... 2000(e)-5 . . . of
this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter pro-
vides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability and violation of any provision of
this chapter, or regulations promulgated under § 12116 of this title, con-
cerning employment.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1).
233. Id.
234. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110.
235. Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 202 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted); Millard v. La Pointe's Fashion Store, Inc., 736 F.2d 501, 502-03 (9th
Cir. 1984).
236. Millard, 736 F.2d at 503; Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir.
1992).
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even one day.23 7 The 90 day period begins to run when the Right
to Sue Notice is received.
2 38
In McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. ,239 the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals addressed the statute of limitations issue
based upon the State of North Carolina's counterpart to the RA,
and upheld the application of a 180-day statute of limitations based
upon the state counterpart statutory scheme, concluding that it was
not inconsistent with the federal policies behind the RA. The court
noted that a short statute of limitations is not uncommon among
federal civil rights statutes and serves the goals of prompt notifica-
tion and swift resolution of the conflict.240 The court also noted
that both the Civil Rights Act of 1991241 and the ADA require claim-
ants to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged
unlawful employment practice. The court stated that when a plain-
tiff fails to file a complaint with the EEOC within the 180 days, the
claim is time-barred. Hence, the court reasoned that the filing re-
quirement acts as a 180-day statute of limitations for many plaintiffs
seeking relief under either the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or the
237. Wong v. Bon Marche, 508 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975) (complaint filed by pro se
plaintiff one day after the 90 day period expired was properly dismissed by the District
Court - the requirement for filing a complaint within 90 days is jurisdictional.); Peete v.
American Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1989); Harvey v. City of New Bern
Police Dep't, 813 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Altech Specialties Steele Corp.,
731 F.2d 143, 146 (2nd Cir. 1984) (holding that the 90-day requirement should be
strictly enforced and not extended "by even one day."); Rice v. New England College,
676 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1982); Melendez v. Singer-Friden Corp., 529 F.2d 321 (10th Cir.
1976) (dismissal proper where complaint filed 91 days after receipt of Notice of Right
to Sue letter).
238. See, e.g., Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir. 1982); Harvey, 813
F.2d at 653-54 (90 day period began when the EEOC's Right to Sue letter was received
by claimant's wife even though claimant did not learn of letter until six days later);
Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1248-50 (5th Cir. 1985) (90 day pe-
riod began when EEOC's Right to Sue letter was received by claimant's wife even
though claimant did not learn about the letter until he returned from out-of-town eight
days later); Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F.2d 691, 692-93 (11th Cir. 1983) (90 day period
began when claimant's 17-year-old son signed a return receipt for EEOC's Right to Sue
letter in spite of claimant's contention he did not see the letter until one or two days
later).
239. 35 F.3d 127 (4th Cir. 1994).
240. Id. at 131.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1).
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ADA.
2 4 2 The court concluded that it was unlikely that Congress,
while enacting a 180-day time-bar for an ADA claim, would not ap-
prove of the same limitations period under the RA.
243
Although based upon the application of an analogous state
statute, the Fourth Circuit Court's reasoning in McCullough is a
more sound and accurate application of Congress's intent in enact-
ing Section 1988. The first step in determining what is the applica-
ble statute of limitations period is to look at the laws of the United
States so far as such laws are suitable to carry the civil rights statutes
into effect.2 44 A court must look to the laws of the United States
before it even looks to the laws of the forum state for an analogous
state statute of limitations period. Because the RA and the ADA are
twin statutes with identical purposes, it stands to reason that the
administrative filing deadlines that apply to the ADA should apply
to a private cause of action arising out of a Section 504 violation.
245
Courts should not have to look for an analogous state statute be-
cause the requirements and deadlines in the ADA are suitable to
carry out the purposes of the RA. A contrary result may lead to
inconsistencies between these twin civil rights legislations.
For example, assume that an employee works for a private en-
tity that not only receives federal funding, but is also subject to the
ADA. If the private entity discriminates against the employee be-
cause of the employee's disability, then the employee may sue the
private entity for an RA violation and an ADA violation. As dis-
cussed in Section I supra, the ADA claim is subject to administrative
prerequisites, but the RA claim is not. If the employee failed to file
a complaint with the EEOC within the 180-day or 300-day require-
ment and/or failed to sue within the 90-day period after receiving
the Notice of the Right to Sue letter, then the employee's ADA
claim is time-barred. However, assuming that the statute of limita-
tions period for a personal injury claim in the forum state has not
242. McCullough, 35 F.3d at 131 (citing Jarrell v. U. S. Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 1088,
1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the EEOC filing requirements "are not jurisdic-
tional prerequisites to suit, but are more 'like a statute of limitations')).
243. Id. at 132.
244. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
245. Cf, Allison v. Dep't of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the ADA has no federal funding requirement, but it is otherwise similar in sub-
stance to the RA, and "cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable").
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expired, the employee still has a viable RA claim against the em-
ployer. Because the remedies available for an RA violation are
nearly identical to the remedies available under ADA, the employee
essentially has not sacrificed by failing to timely file a complaint or
by otherwise following the administrative procedures for an ADA
violation. Consequently, under this scenario, a claimant can avoid
the administrative procedures of the EEOC and the accompanying
administrative deadlines merely by pursuing an RA claim rather
than an ADA claim.
Although this scenario may be favorable to a claimant who has
inadvertently missed the administrative deadlines or who was una-
ware of the administrative prerequisites in the first instance, it does
not allow the EEOC, as the agency with specialized knowledge and
expertise in the area, to effectively eliminate unlawful employment
practices before the necessity of instituting civil actions.2 46 In enact-
ing civil rights legislation, Congress placed great emphasis upon
private settlement and the elimination of discriminatory practices
without litigation.2 47 Congress also believed that voluntary compli-
ance with civil rights statutes is preferable to litigation. 248 If courts
adopt a statute of limitations period for an RA violation based upon
the forum state's personal injury statute, then not only do RA claim-
ants have broader access to the courts than ADA claimants, ADA
claimants who pursue a comparable RA claim can essentially cir-
cumvent the EEOC's mandate to voluntarily eliminate employment
discrimination.
C. Continuing Violation and the Statue of Limitations.
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed these administrative
sublimits in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.2 49 In Mor-
gan, plaintiff Morgan sued the National Railroad Passenger Corp.
246. Cf, Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199, 203 (C.D. Cal.
1968) ("The primary purpose in setting up the EEOC was to establish a method of
eliminating unlawful employment practices, where actually found to exist, through con-
ference, conciliation, and persuasion without the necessity of instituting civil actions.");
Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 334 (3rd Cir. 1970) (primary role of
the EEOC is to eliminate unlawful employment practices by informal means leading to
voluntary compliance).
247. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968).
248. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1969).
249. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
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(Amtrak) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Morgan
alleged that Amtrak maintained a racially hostile work environment
throughout his employment; that he was personally discriminated
against; and that he was retaliated against.
2 50
Morgan filed his EEOC charge, claiming discrimination and
retaliation, on February 27, 1995.251 His complaint stated that he
had been "consistently harassed and disciplined more harshly than
other employees on account of his race." 252 A "Notice of Right to
Sue" letter was issued by the EEOC, and Morgan filed a lawsuit
within 90 days of his receiving the Right to Sue letter.2 53 He alleged
that some of the discriminatory acts had occurred within 300 days
of the EEOC filing, while many of the discriminatory acts occurred
prior to that time period.
254
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Am-
trak, excluding from Morgan's suit those incidents of discrimina-
tion that had taken place more than 300 days before the EEOC
charge was filed.2 55 The district court applied the test utilized by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Galloway v. General Motors
Service Parts Operations:256 a " [p] laintiff may not base [the] suit on
conduct that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless it
would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before
the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the conduct
could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable harassment only in
light of events that occurred later, within the period of the statute
of limitations". Applying its "continuing violation doctrine,"257 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 2 58 Under the "continuing
violation doctrine" courts will "'consider conduct that would ordi-
narily be barred' as long as the untimely incidents represent an
250. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104.
251. Id. Morgan also cross-filed a charge with the California Department of Fair






256. 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996).
257. See Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999).
258. Morgan v. Amtrack, 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (2000).
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ongoing unlawful employment practice." 259 The "continuing viola-
tion doctrine" permits plaintiffs to provide evidence that a continu-
ing violation has occurred which then permits a recovery for claims
filed outside the statutory time period in one of two situations: 1)
where there are a series of related acts (a serial violation), one or
more of which are within the limitations period;260 or 2) where
there is a systemic discriminatory policy or practice (a systemic vio-
lation) that has been followed, in part, within the limitations pe-
riod.261 According to the Ninth Circuit, for a serial violation to
occur, the alleged acts of discrimination occurring before the limi-
tations period must be sufficiently similar to those that occurred
during the limitations period.262
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 263 and ultimately re-
versed in part and affirmed in part the Ninth Circuit's decision.2 64
The Court began its analysis by identifying the critical questions to
be analyzed: "What constitutes an 'unlawful employment prac-
tice,"'265 and when has that practice "occurred"?266 Taking the
"easier question" first, the Court held that discrete retaliatory, or
discriminatory acts, occur on the day in which each act happens.2 67
Therefore, a charge must be filed either within 180 or 300 days of
the date of the discrete act in order to be actionable. 268 Where
discrete acts are themselves time barred, they are not actionable
"even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed
charges." 269 Similarly, the discrete acts that fall within the statutory
259. Morgan, 232 F.3d at 1014. (quoting Anderson, 190 F.3d 930).
260. Id. at 1015-16.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 533 U.S. 927 (2001).
264. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106-07.
265. The term "practice" applies to a discrete act or single "occurrence" even when
it is connected to other acts. Morgan, 563 U.S. at 111.
266. Id. at 112.
267. Id. Discrete acts include, for example, termination, failure to promote, denial
of transfer or refusal to hire. Id. at 114.
268. Id. at 111.
269. Id. at 114. ("the existence of past acts and the employees prior knowledge of
their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related
discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges address-
ing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from
using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.").
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time period do not make acts falling outside the time period
actionable.
270
The Court in Morgan next analyzed plaintiffs hostile work en-
vironment claim. The Court began this analysis with the following
observation:
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from dis-
crete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct
[citation omitted], the "unlawful employment practice
therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day.
It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in
direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment
may not be actionable on its own. [Citations omitted]
Such claims are based on the cumulative effect of individ-
ual acts.
2 7 1
Thus, hostile work environment claims are comprised of a series of
separate acts collectively constituting one unlawful employment
practice. 272 The Court in Morgan held that a charge alleging a hos-
tile work environment will not be time barred if all acts constituting
the claim are part of the same unlawful discriminatory practice and
if at least one act falls within the filing period.
2 73
Many courts have recognized a hostile work environment claim
under the RA and the ADA.274 The Supreme Court's holding in
Morgan, therefore, is applicable to a hostile working environment
claim brought under the RA regardless of what statute of limita-
tions period applies. In addition, although not discussed in detail
in this Article, the authors believe that the analysis in Morgan may
270. Morgan, 563 U.S. at 11 (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553
(1977)).
271. Id. at 113.
272. Id. at 114; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
273. Morgan, 563 U.S. at 114.
274. Soledad v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2002) (dis-
cussing without deciding disabilities-based hostile work environment claim under RA);
Flowers v. Southern Reg'I Physician Serv., Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001) (recogniz-
ing right to disabilities based hostile work environment claim under ADA); Keever v.
City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998) (ADA); Cody v. CIGNA Health-
care, 139 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1998) (ADA).
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also apply to an RA or ADA violation based upon the employer's
failure to engage, in good faith, in the interactive process.
275
VIII. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR RA VIOLATIONS.
When deciding whether a public official is immune from liabil-
ity for acts performed in his official capacity, qualified immunity is
the general rule and absolute immunity is the exceptional case. 276
An official claiming immunity has the burden of demonstrating
that public policy requires absolute immunity.2 77 The presence of
immunity depends on the nature of the function that the official
275. When an employee needs a reasonable accommodation for a disability, it is
the employee's responsibility to request that some accommodation be made. Once the
employee makes the request for an accommodation, the parties must engage in an
"interactive process" in order to identify the "precise limitations" due to the disability
and to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation. The "interactive pro-
cess" requires: (1) direct communication between the employee and the employer to
explore in good faith the possible accommodations; (2) consideration of the em-
ployee's request; and (3) offering an accommodation that is reasonable and effective.
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 (1980); Morgan,
536 U.S. 101; Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.
2002). Once an accommodation has been properly requested, the responsibility for
fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between the employer and the em-
ployee. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996); Beck v.
Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996). A party
that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith. Beck, 75 F.3d
at 1135. An employer can only be held liable for failure to provide a reasonable accom-
modation when the employer bears the responsibility for the breakdown of the interac-
tive process. Id.; see also, Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). The employee's failure to participate in this interactive
process will preclude any claim that the employer violated the ADA or the RA by failing
to provide a reasonable accommodation. Stewart, 117 F.3d. at 1287; Steffes v. Stepan
Co., 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998).
The very nature of the interactive process involves a process over time. If the em-
ployer does not engage in the interactive process in good faith at all, then that may
constitute a discrete violation of the RA which immediately triggers the running of the
statute of limitations period. The same is true of the ADA. Namely, the complete fail-
ure to engage in the interactive process will trigger the 300-day timeframe for filing a
charge with the EEOC. The interesting issue arises when the employer does engage in
the interactive process but some time during the process fails to act in good faith. Us-
ing the analysis in Morgan, courts should analogize the situation to a hostile working
environment and should not consider a lawsuit time barred if at least one incident of
the employer's bad faith engagement in the interactive process falls within the statute
of limitations period for the RA or the filing period for the ADA.
276. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978).
277. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808; Butz, 438 U.S. at 406-07.
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was performing when engaged in the activity that provoked the law-
suit and not on the official's title or agency relationship.
278
The Supreme Court has not decided whether there can be in-
dividual liability of supervisors under the ADA or the RA.2 79 In ad-
dressing the issue of individual liability in the non-Section 504
context, some federal courts have focused on the definition of the
offender from whom the discrimination victim can recover. If the
discrimination victim can only recover from an entity, then, by defi-
nition, the statute does not impose individual liability. For exam-
ple, ADA enforces its prohibitions against employers, places of
public accommodation, and other organizations. 280 The ADA does
not enforce its prohibitions against the employees or managers of
these organizations. 281 Consequently, circuit courts have held that
the ADA does not impose individual liability.28 2 In fact, the major-
ity of circuits that have visited this issue have also held that no per-
278. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
279. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 992 (1st Cir. 1997) (circuit court
did not resolve issue declining to address); Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931,
951-52 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
280. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding no personal liabil-
ity under Title II of the ADA).
281. Key v. Grayson, 163 F.Supp.2d 697, 715 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("Only 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(c) explicitly addresses the issue, providing in employment actions against
the federal government, that the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropri-
ate, shall be the defendant. This statutory directive suggests that plaintiff's cannot assert
claims against individuals in their individual capacities.")
282. Snyder, 213 F.3d at 346; Silk v. Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir.
1999) (holding there is no personal liability under Title I of ADA); EEOC v. AIC Sec.
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-81 (7th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases and finding
the ADA does not impose individual liability); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d
999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Title II). See also Meara v. Bennett, 27 F.
Supp.2d 288, 290 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding ADA does not impose individual liability);
Miller v. CBC Companies, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1065 (D.N.H. 1995) (same); but see,
Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding individual liability per-
missible under ADA).
As the Eighth Circuit reasoned:
Title II provides disabled individuals redress for discrimination by a "public
entity." That term, as it is defined within the statute, does not include
individuals.
Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1005 n.8 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit determined that individual liability may be available under Title
III of the ADA if the individual owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommoda-
tion. Emerson v. Thiel Coll, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002).
2003]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
sonal liability can attach to agents or supervisors under Title VII or
the ADEA.
283
With regard to the RA, remedies available to a victim of dis-
crimination alleging a Section 504 violation are for infractions by
any "program" or "activity" receiving federal assistance. 284 Thus,
Section 504's prohibitions, like those of the ADA, are addressed to
an entity and are not addressed to the employees or managers of
that entity. Consequently, a similar rationale applies and, there-
fore, Section 504 should not impose individual liability. In fact,
some courts, with little analysis, have held that Section 504 does not
impose individual liability.
28 5
283. The definition of "employer" contained in the ADA is similar to definitions in
Title VII of the 1994 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b). Circuit Courts have also held that there is no individual liability under either
Title VII or the ADEA. See, e.g., Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th
Cir. 1997) (finding individual liability prohibited under Title VII); Smith v. Lomax, 45
F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding individuals "cannot be held liable under
the ADEA or Title VII."); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir.
1994) ("the ADEA limits civil liability to the employer.. . ."); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l
Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) (Title VII and ADEA); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931
F.2d 764, 772 (lth Cir. 1991) ("The relief granted under Title VII is against the em-
ployer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the
Act."). See also Acevedo Vargas v. Colon, 2 F.Supp.2d 202, 206-07 (D.P.R. 1998) (Title
VII).
284. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (2).
285. Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 102 F.3d 1118, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1274 (1997) (finding no personal liability for supervisors under either
RA or ADA); Calloway v. Borough of Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp.2d 543, 557
(D.N.J. 2000) (Title II and Section 504) (collecting similar cases); Montez v. Romer, 32
F. Supp.2d 1235, 1240-41 (D. Colo. 1999) (Title II and Section 504); Neiberger v. Haw-
kins, 208 F.R.D. 301, 312 (D. Colo. 2002); Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 692
(D. Haw. 2000).
In contrast, liability under Section 1983 may not be imposed on a theory of respon-
deat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1976). A plain-
tiff may be entitled to damages under Section 1983 if he establishes that intentional
discrimination was the official policy of the government. Id. at 691. To establish individ-
ual liability against a government official for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must
show that "the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a fed-
eral right." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). "A supervisor is only liable
for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or di-
rected the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Tay-
lor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
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CONCLUSION
Congress in enacting the RA left various issues unclear and un-
resolved, including: (1) whether an individual has a private right of
action under the RA; (2) whether a jury trial is available; (3) the
applicable statute of limitations period; (4) whether there is individ-
ual liability for a RA violation; and (5) the availability and extent of
remedies. Many courts have attempted to fill in the gaps and to
clarify the statutory scheme. Congress should again revisit the RA
and clearly resolve these issues.
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Lane v. Pena,286 when
Congress amended the RA in response to the Atascadero decision,
Congress created an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.
28 7
Congress did not, however, specifically abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity from punitive damages. In their current state, these twin
statutes are "unequal." Plaintiffs cannot assert an ADA violation
against a state entity, neither can plaintiffs recover for punitive
damages against a state for ADA violations. However, plaintiffs can
assert an RA violation against a state, but still cannot recover puni-
tive damages for such violations.
Short of Congressional action or inaction, the Supreme Court,
utilizing a Garrett analysis as discussed in Section IV, supra, can con-
clude that although Congress may have unequivocally waived state
sovereign immunity under the RA (as it did in Seminole), neverthe-
less, the waiver was not valid because Congress exceeded its author-
ity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover,
under a Spending Clause analysis as discussed in Section IV., supra,
the waiver should still be considered invalid because states would
not have willingly abrogated their sovereignty absent the unconsti-
tutional conditions imposed by Congress upon the receipt of fed-
eral funds. Given that Congress should not be able to
unconstitutionally expand its limited authority through the "power
of the purse", such conditions should be invalidated. If Congress's
Spending Clause powers remain unchecked, then the nature of the
dual sovereignty system in America is in jeopardy, with federalism
becoming a hodge-podge quilt of unequal states that surrender
286. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
287. Id. at 198.
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their state sovereignty incrementally and differentially depending
upon their dire financial straits and the federal monies they accept.
Because the ADA and RA are similar in purpose and applica-
tion, the authors recommend that the concepts of abrogation and
waiver or lack thereof of sovereign immunity be similarly inter-
preted regardless of how Congress or appellate courts achieve this
equality. Because the Garrett decision has already concluded that
Congress did not validly abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, de-
spite the holding in Lane v. Pena, the Supreme Court should equal-
ize the current disparity between these twin statutes and similarly
conclude that Congress exceeded its Section 5 authority by waiving
a state's sovereign immunity.
